The selectope of a cooperative transferable utility game is the convex hull of the payo Ìˆ vectors obtained by assigning the Harsanyi dividends of the coalitions to members determined by so-calledâ€¦ (More)

This paper is concerned with the question of how to define the core when cooperation takes place in a dynamic setting. The focus is on dynamic cooperative games in which the players face a finiteâ€¦ (More)

Collective decision problems are considered with a finite number of agents who have single-peaked preferences on the real line. A probabilistic decision scheme assigns a probability distribution overâ€¦ (More)

In voting problems where agents have well behaved (Lipschitz continuous) utility functions on a multidimensional space of alternatives, a voting rule is threshold strategy-proof if any agent can onlyâ€¦ (More)

We compare the manipulability of different choice rules by considering the number of manipulable profiles. We establish the minimal number of such profiles for tops-only, anonymous, and surjectiveâ€¦ (More)

We consider several related set extensions of the core and the anticore of games with transferable utility. An efficient allocation is undominated if it cannot be improved, in a specific way, byâ€¦ (More)

In a mutual control structure agents exercise control over each other. Typical examples occur in the area of corporate governance: firms and investment companies exercise mutual control, inâ€¦ (More)

Bargaining under uncertainty is modeled by the assumption that there are several possible states of nature, each of which is identified with a bargaining problem. We characterize bargaining solutionsâ€¦ (More)