Most logic–based approaches characterize abduction as a kind of backwards deduction plus additional conditions, which means that a number of conditions is specified that enable one to decide whether or not a particular abductive inference is sound (one of those conditions may for example be that abductive consequences have to be compatible with the… (More)
In Gricean pragmatics, generalized conversational implicatures (GCI) are the pragmatic rules that allow the hearer to derive the intended meaning of the sentences uttered by the speaker. Moreover, in contradistinction to partic-ularized conversational implicatures, GCI only depend on what is said, and not on the linguistic context. One of the main… (More)
In this paper, I will present a Fitch–style natural deduction proof theory for modal paralogics (modal logics with gaps and/or gluts for negation). Besides the standard classical subproofs, the presented proof theory also contains modal subproofs, which express what would follow from a hypothesis, in case it would be true in some arbitrary world.
Hearers get at the intended meaning of uncooperative utterances (i.e. utterances that conflict with the prescriptions laid down by the Gricean maxims) by pragmatically deriving sentences that reconcile these utterances with the maxims. Such pragmatic derivations are made according to pragmatic rules called implicatures. As they are pragmatic in nature, the… (More)
In order to avoid trivial consequences, the derivability relation of relevant logics (RL) does not support the inference rule disjunctive syllogism (DS). In this paper, I will show that the inference rule DS can be added to this derivability relation in a way that doesn't lead to trivial or irrelevant consequences. To do so, I will rely on the insights… (More)
In this paper, I will characterize a new class of inconsistency–adaptive logics, namely inconsistency–adaptive modal logics. These logics cope with inconsistencies in a modal context. More specifically, when faced with inconsistencies, inconsistency–adaptive modal logics avoid explosion , but still allow the derivation of sufficient consequences to… (More)
When searching for an explanation for a (puzzling) phenomenon, people often reason backwards: from the explanandum to possible explanations. As such, they perform a reasoning process usually called abduction. All abduction processes share a common element: inferences based on the argumentation schema known as Affirming the Consequent (AC): If the classical… (More)
Abduction in Logic. When searching an explanation for a (puzzling) phenomenon, people often reason backwards, from the phenomenon to be explained to possible explanations (see e.g. Aliseda–Llera ). When they do so, they perform abductive inferences, inferences based on the argumentation schema known as Affirming the Consequent: [AC] A ⊃ B, B A As AC is… (More)