Two fundamental axioms in social choice theory are consistency with respect to a variable electorate and consistency with respect to components of similar alternatives. In the context of traditionalâ€¦ (More)

We study the problem of computing possible and necessary winners for partially specified weighted and unweighted tournaments. This problem arises naturally in elections with incompletely specifiedâ€¦ (More)

A tournament T is a pair (A, ), where A is a set of alternatives and is an asymmetric and complete (and thus irreflexive) binary relation on A, usually referred to as the dominance relation. Theâ€¦ (More)

Tournament solutions constitute an important class of social choice functions that only depend on the pairwise majority comparisons between alternatives. Recent analytical results have shown thatâ€¦ (More)

The Deferred Acceptance Algorithm (DAA) is the most widely accepted and used algorithm to match students, workers, or residents to colleges, firms or hospitals respectively. In this paper, weâ€¦ (More)

Tournament solutions, i.e., functions that associate with each complete and asymmetric relation on a set of alternatives a non-empty subset of the alternatives, play an important role within socialâ€¦ (More)

Many hardness results in computational social choice make use of the fact that every directed graph may be induced by the pairwise majority relation. However, this fact requires that the number ofâ€¦ (More)

We conduct a computational analysis of fair and optimal partitions in additively separable hedonic games. We show that, for strict preferences, a Pareto optimal partition can be found in polynomialâ€¦ (More)