Hannes Leitgeb

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We prove that given reasonable assumptions, it is possible to give an explicit definition of belief simpliciter in terms of subjective probability, such that it is neither the case that belief is stripped of any of its usual logical properties, nor is it the case that believed propositions are bound to have probability 1. Belief simpliciter is not to be(More)
One of the fundamental problems of epistemology is to say when the evidence in an agent’s possession justifies the beliefs she holds. In this paper and its prequel, we defend the Bayesian solution to this problem by appealing to the following fundamental norm: Accuracy An epistemic agent ought to minimize the inaccuracy of her partial beliefs. In the(More)
) In Logic across the University: Foundations and Application–Proceedings of the Tsinghua Logic Conference, Beijing, ed. J. van Benthem and F. Liu, 47–54. Volume 47: Studies in Logic. London: College Publications. Levi, Isaac. 1967. Gambling with Truth: An Essay on Induction and the Aims of Science. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.<lb>———. 1980. The Enterprise of(More)
What kinds of sentences with truth predicate may be inserted plausibly and consistently into the T-scheme? We state an answer in terms of dependence: those sentences which depend directly or indirectly on non-semantic states of affairs (only). In order to make this precise we introduce a theory of dependence according to which a sentence φ is said to depend(More)
On the basis of impossibility results on probability, belief revision, and conditionals, it is argued that conditional beliefs differ from beliefs in conditionals qua mental states. Once this is established, it will be pointed out in which sense conditional beliefs are still conditional, even though they may lack conditional contents, and why it is(More)
This paper is a sequel to Leitgeb. We show that certain networks called 'inhibition nets' may be regarded as mechanisms drawing nonmonotonic inferences if only an interpretation of net states as states of belief is introduced. We prove that each of the cumulative logical systems studied by Kraus et al. are sound and complete with respect to certain classes(More)
In Leitgeb[6] we have shown that certain networks called 'inhibition nets' may be regarded as mechanisms drawing nonmonotonic inferences. The main characteristic of inhibition nets is that there are not only excitatory connections between nodes but also inhibitory connections between nodes and excitatory connections. On the cognitive side, contents of(More)