Hannah Riley Bowles

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The authors propose 2 categories of situational moderators of gender in negotiation: situational ambiguity and gender triggers. Reducing the degree of situational ambiguity constrains the influence of gender on negotiation. Gender triggers prompt divergent behavioral responses as a function of gender. Field and lab studies (1 and 2) demonstrated that(More)
Four experiments show that gender diVerences in the propensity to initiate negotiations may be explained by diVerential treatment of men and women when they attempt to negotiate. In Experiments 1 and 2, participants evaluated written accounts of candidates who did or did not initiate negotiations for higher compensation. Evaluators penalized female(More)
PURPOSE To evaluate whether there were differences in acquisition of research grant support between male and female faculty at eight Harvard Medical School-affiliated institutions. METHODS Data were obtained from the participating institutions on all research grant applications submitted by full-time faculty from 2001 through 2003. Data were analyzed by(More)
We conducted three experiments to examine the relationship between gender and reactions to having one’s first offer accepted in negotiations. Building on past research demonstrating that having one’s first offer accepted reduces satisfaction through the generation of upward counterfactual thoughts (Galinsky, seiden, Kim, & medvec, 2002), we examined whether(More)
Negotiation is a process that creates, reinforces, and reduces gender inequality in organizations, yet the study of gender in negotiation has little connection to the study of gender in organizations. We review the literature on gender in job negotiations from psychology and organizational behavior, and propose ways in which this literature could speak more(More)
The behavior of others and the price of giving are two important determinants of contributions to public goods. This paper tests in two field experiments, whether men and women differ in their reaction to either a change in the behavior of the average group behavior or the price of giving, i.e. a matching mechanism. The results of the field experiment show(More)
We study how gradualism -increasing required levels (“thresholds”) of contributions slowly over time rather than requiring a high level of contribution immediately -affects individuals’ decisions to contribute to a public project. Using a laboratory binary choice minimum-effort coordination game, we randomly assign participants to three treatments: starting(More)
This study is based on a framed field experiment conducted in China and the study examines how the pattern of varying threshold levels influences group coordination at high-threshold levels. Of primary interest in varying the threshold level successively is the role of gradualism. We define gradualism as the hypothesis that proposes that allowing agents to(More)