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A growing body of qualitative evidence shows that loss aversion, a phenomenon formalized in prospect theory, can explain a variety of field and experimental data. Quantifications of loss aversion are, however, hindered by the absence of a general preference-based method to elicit the utility for gains and losses simultaneously. This paper proposes such a(More)
T his paper studies the implications of the ''zero-condition'' for multiattribute utility theory. The zero-condition simplifies the measurement and derivation of the Quality Adjusted Life Year (QALY) measure commonly used in medical decision analysis. For general multiattribute utility theory, no simple condition has heretofore been found to characterize(More)
This paper shows that QALYs can be derived from more elementary conditions than thought hitherto in the literature: it suffices to impose risk neutrality for life years in every health state. This derivation of QALYs is appealing because it does not require knowledge of concepts from utility theory such as utility independence. Therefore our axiomatization(More)
This paper explores biases in the elicitation of utilities under risk and the contribution that generalizations of expected utility can make to the resolution of these biases. We used five methods to measure utilities under risk and found clear violations of expected utility. Of the theories studies, prospect theory was most consistent with our data. The(More)
Theories of reference-dependent preferences propose that individuals evaluate outcomes as gains or losses relative to a neutral reference point. We test for reference dependence in a large dataset of marathon finishing times (n = 9, 789, 093). Models of reference-dependent preferences such as prospect theory predict bunching of finishing times at reference(More)
Prospect theory is currently the main descriptive theory of decision under uncertainty. It generalizes expected utility by introducing nonlinear decision weighting and loss aversion. A difficulty in the study of multiattribute utility under prospect theory is to determine when an attribute yields a gain or a loss. One possibility, which has been adopted in(More)
Daniel Ellsberg (1961) constructed counterexamples to show the limitations of Leonard J. Savage's (1954) subjective expected utility (SEU). Ellsberg's examples involved a comparison between objective uncertainty (risk), in which probabilities are known, and subjective uncertainty, in which they are not. The prevailing preference for objective over(More)
This paper tests the internal consistency of time trade-off utilities. We find significant violations of consistency in the direction predicted by loss aversion. The violations disappear for higher gauge durations. We show that loss aversion can also explain that for short gauge durations time trade-off utilities exceed standard gamble utilities. Our(More)
T his paper introduces a method to measure regret theory, a popular theory of decision under uncertainty. Regret theory allows for violations of transitivity, and it may seem paradoxical to quantitatively measure an intransitive theory. We adopt the trade-off method and show that it is robust to violations of transitivity. Our method makes no assumptions(More)