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Executive compensation structure, ownership, and firm performance
An examination of the executive compensation structure of 153 randomly-selected manufacturing firms in 1979-1980 provides evidence supporting advocates of incentive compensation, and also suggestsExpand
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Is Corporate Governance Different for Bank Holding Companies?
1. INTRODUCTION In the wake of the recent corporate scandals, corporate governance practices have received heightened attention. Shareholders, creditors, regulators, and academics are examining theExpand
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Bank Board Structure and Performance: Evidence for Large Bank Holding Companies
The subprime crisis highlights how little we know about bank governance. This paper addresses a long-standing gap in the literature by analyzing the relationship between board governance andExpand
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Corporate Performance, Board Structure and its Determinants in the Banking Industry
We examine the relation between board structure (size and composition) and firm performance using a sample of banking firms during 1959-1999. Contrary to the evidence for non-financial firms, we findExpand
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Executive Incentive Plans, Corporate Control, and Capital Structure
Agency theory recognizes that the interests of managers and shareholders may conflict and that, left on their own, managers may make major financial policy decisions, such as the choice of a capitalExpand
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Corporate Performance, Board Structure, and Their Determinants in the Banking Industry
The subprime crisis highlights how little we know about the governance of banks. This paper addresses a long-standing gap in the literature by analyzing board governance using a sample of bankingExpand
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Bank Capital and Value in the Cross Section
We develop a dynamic model of bank capital structure in an acquisitions context which predicts: (i) total bank value and the bank's equity capital are positively correlated in the cross-section, andExpand
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The Economics of Conflicts of Interest in Financial Institutions
A conflict of interest exists when a party to a transaction could potentially make a gain from taking actions that are detrimental to the other party in the transaction. This paper examines theExpand
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Caught between Scylla and Charybdis? Regulating Bank Leverage When There is Rent-Seeking and Risk-Shifting
We consider a model in which banks face two moral hazard problems: 1) asset substitution by shareholders, which can occur when banks make socially-inefficient, risky loans; and 2) managerialExpand
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Outside Monitoring and CEO Compensation in the Banking Industry
We hypothesize that CEO compensation is optimally designed to trade off two types of agency problems: the standard shareholder-management agency problem as well as the risk-shifting problem betweenExpand
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