• Publications
  • Influence
The Evolution of Conventions
The author shows how a group of individuals can learn to play a coordination game without any common knowledge and with only a small amount of rationality. The game is repeated many times by
Monotonic solutions of cooperative games
The principle of monotonicity for cooperative games states that if a game changes so that some player's contribution to all coalitions increases or stays the same then the player's allocation should
Individual Strategy and Social Structure: An Evolutionary Theory of Institutions
A reorientation of game theory in which players are not hyper-rational and knowledge is incomplete is suggested; a simple adaptive learning process is proposed; and this framework is applied to the study of social and economic institutions.
Equity - in theory and practice
  • H. Young
  • Political Science
  • 10 January 1994
In "Equity: In Theory and Practice", Peyton Young offers a systematic explanation of what the authors mean by fairness in distributing public resources and burdens, and applies the theory to actual cases.
An Evolutionary Model of Bargaining
Abstract Individuals from two populations of bargainers are randomly matched to play the Nash demand game. They make their demands by choosing best replies based on an incomplete knowledge of the
Condcrcet's criterion states that an alternative that defeats every other by a simple majority is the socially optimal choice. Condorcet argued that if the object of voting is to determine the
Strategic Learning and Its Limits
This book provides a valuable primer that delineates what the authors know, what they would like to know, and the limits of what they can know, when they try to learn about a system that is composed of other learners.