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  • Influence
A unified analysis of rational voting with private values and group-specific costs
We provide a unified analysis of the canonical rational voting model with privately known political preferences and costs of voting. Focusing on type-symmetric equilibrium, we show that for smallExpand
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Why charities announce donations: a positive perspective
Charities frequently announce contributions of donors as they accrue. Doing so induces donors to play a sequential-move rather than simultaneous-move game. We examine the conditions under which aExpand
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Public Information and Electoral Bias
We present a theory of strategic voting that predicts elections are more likely to be close and voter turnout is more likely to be high when citizens possess better public information about theExpand
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Proposal power and majority rule in multilateral bargaining with costly recognition
  • H. Yildirim
  • Economics, Computer Science
  • J. Econ. Theory
  • 1 September 2007
This paper studies a sequential bargaining model in which, as in the rent-seeking literature, agents expend resources to be the proposer, and agreement requires affirmative votes of either all agentsExpand
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Managing Dynamic Competition
In many important high-technology markets, including software development, data processing, communications, aeronautics, and defense, suppliers learn through experience how to provide better serviceExpand
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Payoff Uncertainty, Bargaining Power, and the Strategic Sequencing of Bilateral Negotiations
This paper investigates the sequencing choice of a buyer who negotiates with the sellers of two complementary objects with uncertain payoffs. We show that the sequencing matters to the buyer onlyExpand
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Contests with multiple rounds
  • H. Yildirim
  • Economics, Computer Science
  • Games Econ. Behav.
  • 1 April 2005
This paper studies contests where players have the flexibility to add to their previous efforts after observing their rivals’ most recent effort in an intermediate stage. It is found that (1)Expand
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Public information and electoral bias
We present a theory of strategic voting that predicts elections are more likely to be close and voter turnout is more likely to be high when citizens possess better public information about theExpand
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Information Acquisition and Strategic Sequencing in Bilateral Trading: Is Ignorance Bliss?
This paper examines optimal sequencing of complementary deals with privately known values. It is shown that an informed buyer begins with the high value seller to minimize future holdup. Together,Expand
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On the endogeneity of Cournot-Nash and Stackelberg equilibria: games of accumulation
Abstract We characterize equilibria of games with two properties: (i) Agents have the opportunity to adjust their strategic variable after their initial choices and before payoffs occur; but (ii)Expand
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