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  • Influence
Does Corporate Governance Matter in Competitive Industries?
By reducing the threat of a hostile takeover, business combination (BC) laws weaken corporate governance and increase the opportunity for managerial slack. Consistent with the notion that competitionExpand
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The Effect of Capital Market Characteristics on the Value of Start-Up Firms
We develop an equilibrium model of contracting, bargaining, and search in which the relative scarcity of venture capital affects the bargaining power of entrepreneurs and venture capitalists. This inExpand
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Capital and Labor Reallocation within Firms
We document how a shock to investment opportunities at one plant (“treated plant”) spills over to other plants within the same firm, but only if the firm is financially constrained. To provide theExpand
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A Lender-Based Theory of Collateral
We consider an imperfectly competitive loan market in which a local relationship lender has an information advantage vis-a-vis distant transaction lenders. Competitive pressure from the transactionExpand
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Legal Investor Protection and Takeovers
This paper examines the role of legal investor protection for the efficiency of the market for corporate control when bidders are financially constrained. In the model, stronger legal investorExpand
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Inside Vs Outside Ownership: A Political Theory of the Firm
If contracting within the firm is incomplete, managers will expend resources on trying to appropriate a share of the surplus that is generated. We show that outside ownership may alleviate theExpand
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Snow and Leverage
This paper examines whether reducing a debt overhang improves borrowers' operating performance using a sample of distressed and highly overleveraged Austrian ski hotels undergoing debtExpand
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Distributional Conflict in Organizations
TLDR
We show that multi-divisional organizations may involve lower influence costs than single-tier organizations, even though they offer more scope for organizational conflict and have more executives that can be influenced. Expand
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Capital and Labor Reallocation Inside Firms
We document how a plant-specific shock to investment opportunities at one plant of a firm ("treated plant") spills over to other plants of the same firm-but only if the firm is financiallyExpand
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Firms' Internal Networks and Local Economic Shocks
This paper shows that firms spread the adverse impacts of local employment shocks across regions through their internal networks of establishments. Linking confidential micro data at theExpand
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