Author pages are created from data sourced from our academic publisher partnerships and public sources.
- Publications
- Influence
Efficient Resource Allocation on the Basis of Priorities
- H. Ergin
- Economics
- 1 November 2002
Many institutions allocate resources by non-market mechanisms based on priorities. In this paper, we introduce a model of resource allocation on the basis of priorities and address the following… Expand
Games of school choice under the Boston mechanism
Many school districts in the U.S. use a student assignment mechanism that we refer to as the Boston mechanism. Under this mechanism a student loses his priority at a school unless his parents rank it… Expand
What's the Matter with Tie-Breaking? Improving Efficiency in School Choice
In several school choice districts in the United States, the student proposing deferred acceptance algorithm is applied after indifferences in priority orders are broken in some exogenous way.… Expand
A theory of subjective compound lotteries
TLDR
A subjective theory of compound lotteries
We develop a Savage-type model of choice under uncertainty in which agents identify uncertain prospects with subjective compound lotteries. Our theory permits issue preference; that is, agents may… Expand
- 76
- 12
Framing Contingencies ∗
- David S. Ahn, H. Ergin
- 2007
The subjective likelihood of a contingency often depends on the manner in which it is described to the decision maker. To accommodate this dependence, we introduce a model of decision making under… Expand
A Unique Costly Contemplation Representation
TLDR
Consistency in house allocation problems
- H. Ergin
- Mathematics
- 1 August 2000
Abstract In house allocation problems, we look for a systematic way of assigning a set of indivisible objects, e.g., houses, to a group of individuals having preferences over these objects. Typical… Expand
Two-sided matching with indifferences
TLDR
Costly Contemplation ∗
- H. Ergin
- 2003
We study preferences over opportunity sets. Such preferences are monotone if every opportunity set is at least as good as its subsets. We prove a representation theorem for monotone preferences. The… Expand
- 22
- 6
- PDF
...
1
2
3
...