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Efficient Resource Allocation on the Basis of Priorities
Many institutions allocate resources by non-market mechanisms based on priorities. In this paper, we introduce a model of resource allocation on the basis of priorities and address the followingExpand
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Games of school choice under the Boston mechanism
Many school districts in the U.S. use a student assignment mechanism that we refer to as the Boston mechanism. Under this mechanism a student loses his priority at a school unless his parents rank itExpand
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What's the Matter with Tie-Breaking? Improving Efficiency in School Choice
In several school choice districts in the United States, the student proposing deferred acceptance algorithm is applied after indifferences in priority orders are broken in some exogenous way.Expand
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A theory of subjective compound lotteries
TLDR
We develop a Savage-type model of choice under uncertainty in which agents identify uncertain prospects with subjective compound lotteries. Expand
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A subjective theory of compound lotteries
We develop a Savage-type model of choice under uncertainty in which agents identify uncertain prospects with subjective compound lotteries. Our theory permits issue preference; that is, agents mayExpand
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Framing Contingencies ∗
The subjective likelihood of a contingency often depends on the manner in which it is described to the decision maker. To accommodate this dependence, we introduce a model of decision making underExpand
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A Unique Costly Contemplation Representation
TLDR
We study preferences over menus which can be represented as if the individual is uncertain of her tastes, but is able to engage in costly contemplation before selecting an alternative from a menu. Expand
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Consistency in house allocation problems
Abstract In house allocation problems, we look for a systematic way of assigning a set of indivisible objects, e.g., houses, to a group of individuals having preferences over these objects. TypicalExpand
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Two-sided matching with indifferences
TLDR
We allow ties in preference rankings and show that the Pareto dominance relation on stable matchings can be captured by two simple operations which involve rematching of workers and firms via cycles or chains . Expand
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Costly Contemplation ∗
We study preferences over opportunity sets. Such preferences are monotone if every opportunity set is at least as good as its subsets. We prove a representation theorem for monotone preferences. TheExpand
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