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The Discovery and Reporting of Internal Control Deficiencies Prior to SOX-Mandated Audits
This paper uses firms' disclosures of internal control problems prior to audits mandated by Section 404 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) to investigate the economic factors that expose firms toExpand
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The Effects of Corporate Governance on Firms' Credit Ratings
We investigate whether firms with strong corporate governance benefit from higher credit ratings relative to firms with weaker governance. Expand
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The Effect of SOX Internal Control Deficiencies and Their Remediation on Accrual Quality
This paper investigates the effect of internal control deficiencies and their remediation on accrual quality. We first document that firms reporting internal control deficiencies have lower qualityExpand
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The Effect of SOX Internal Control Deficiencies on Firm Risk and Cost of Equity
ABSTRACT The Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) mandates management evaluation and independent audits of internal control effectiveness. The mandate is costly to firms but may yield benefits through lowerExpand
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Do Non-Audit Services Compromise Auditor Independence? Further Evidence
This paper challenges the findings of Frankel et al. (2002) (FJN). The results of our discretionary accruals tests differ from FJN's when we adjust discretionary current accruals for firmExpand
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The Effect of Internal Control Deficiencies on Firm Risk and Cost of Equity Capital
Theoretically, internal control quality is related to the cost of capital through its effect on idiosyncratic and systematic risk. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) mandates audits of internal control andExpand
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Does stock price synchronicity rep-resent firm-specific information
Much of prior international accounting research imp l citly assumes that stock prices capture similar amounts of firm-specific informatio n across countries. Recent research asserts that stock priceExpand
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