Hülya Eraslan

Learn More
In this paper we consider multilateral stochastic bargaining models with general agreement rules. For n-player games where in each period a player is randomly selected to allocate a stochastic level of surplus and q n players have to agree on a proposal to induce its acceptance, we characterize the set of stationary subgame perfect equilibrium payoffs and(More)
We study a model of sequential bargaining in which, in each period before an agreement is reached, a proposer is randomly selected, the proposer suggests a division of a pie of size one, each other agent either approves or rejects the proposal, and the proposal is implemented if the set of approving agents is a winning coalition for the proposer. We show(More)
We study the possibility of trade for purely informational reasons. We depart from previous analyses (e.g. Grossman and Stiglitz 1980 and Milgrom and Stokey 1982) by allowing the final payoff of the asset being traded to depend on an action taken by its eventual owner. We characterize conditions under which equilibria with trade exist. We demonstrate that(More)
Dutta et al. (Econometrica 69 (2001) 1013) (Dutta, Jackson, and Le Breton—DJLeB) initiate the study of manipulation of voting procedures by a candidate who withdraws from the election. A voting procedure is candidate stable if this is never possible. We extend the DJLeB framework by allowing: (a) the outcome of the procedure to be a set of candidates; (b)(More)
When a firm files for Chapter 11 bankruptcy in the U.S., negotiations take place among its claimants to decide what to do with the firm and who gets what. If an agreement cannot be reached, then the firm is likely to be liquidated. Consequently, the liquidation value of the firm plays a crucial role in the deal that is struck among the claimants. In this(More)
Prior research on “strategic voting” has reached the conclusion that unanimity rule is uniquely bad: it results in destruction of information, and hence makes voters worse off. We show that this conclusion depends critically on the assumption that the issue being voted on is exogenous, i.e., independent of the voting rule used. We depart from the existing(More)
In a financial contracting model, we study the optimal debt structure to resolve financial distress. We show that a debt structure where two distinct debt classes co-exist − one class fully concentrated and with control rights upon default, the other dispersed and without control rights − removes the controlling creditor’s liquidation bias when investor(More)