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We consider a multilateral sequential bargaining model in which the players may differ in their probability of being selected as the proposer and the rate at which they discount future payoffs. For games in which agreement requires less than unanimous consent, we characterize the set of stationary subgame perfect equilibrium payoffs. With this… (More)

In this paper we consider multilateral stochastic bargaining models with general agreement rules. For n-player games where in each period a player is randomly selected to allocate a stochastic level of surplus and qn players have to agree on a proposal to induce its acceptance, we characterize the set of stationary subgame perfect equilibrium payoffs and… (More)

We study a model of sequential bargaining in which, in each period before an agreement is reached, a proposer is randomly selected, the proposer suggests a division of a pie of size one, each other agent either approves or rejects the proposal, and the proposal is implemented if the set of approving agents is a winning coalition for the proposer. We show… (More)

Dutta et al. initiate the study of manipulation of voting procedures by a candidate who withdraws from the election. A voting procedure is candidate stable if this is never possible. We extend the DJLeB framework by allowing: (a) the outcome of the procedure to be a set of candidates; (b) some or all of the voters to have weak preference orderings of the… (More)

1 This paper previously circulated under the title " Information, trade and common knowledge with endogenous asset values. " We thank We are especially grateful to an editor and three anonymous referees for some extremely helpful and constructive comments. Any errors are our own. Abstract We study the possibility of trade for purely informational reasons.… (More)

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