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In this paper we consider multilateral stochastic bargaining models with general agreement rules. For n-player games where in each period a player is randomly selected to allocate a stochastic level of surplus and qn players have to agree on a proposal to induce its acceptance, we characterize the set of stationary subgame perfect equilibrium payoffs and(More)
1 I thank two anonymous referees for their thoughtful comments and suggestions. Abstract When a firm files for Chapter 11 bankruptcy in the U.S., negotiations take place among its claimants to decide what to do with the firm and who gets what. If an agreement cannot be reached, then the firm is likely to be liquidated. Consequently, the liquidation value of(More)
Do mandatory spending programs such as Medicare improve efficiency? We analyze a model with two parties allocating a fixed budget to a public good and private transfers each period over an infinite horizon. We compare two institutions that differ in whether public good spending is discretionary or mandatory. We model mandatory spending as an endogenous(More)
Dutta et al. initiate the study of manipulation of voting procedures by a candidate who withdraws from the election. A voting procedure is candidate stable if this is never possible. We extend the DJLeB framework by allowing: (a) the outcome of the procedure to be a set of candidates; (b) some or all of the voters to have weak preference orderings of the(More)
1 This paper previously circulated under the title " Information, trade and common knowledge with endogenous asset values. " We thank We are especially grateful to an editor and three anonymous referees for some extremely helpful and constructive comments. Any errors are our own. Abstract We study the possibility of trade for purely informational reasons.(More)
We study a model of sequential bargaining in which, in each period before an agreement is reached, a proposer is randomly selected, the proposer suggests a division of a pie of size one, each other agent either approves or rejects the proposal, and the proposal is implemented if the set of approving agents is a winning coalition for the proposer. We show(More)
and audiences at various seminars and conferences for helpful comments and stimulating conversations. We are also grateful to Martin Osborne (the editor) and three anonymous referees for very helpful and detailed comments and suggestions. Any errors are our own. Abstract We analyze a three-player legislative bargaining game over an ideological and a(More)
In a financial contracting model, we study the optimal debt structure to resolve financial distress. We show that a debt structure where two distinct debt classes co-exist − one class fully concentrated and with control rights upon default, the other dispersed and without control rights − removes the controlling creditor's liquidation bias when investor(More)