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Journals and Conferences
This paper studies the relationship between competition and incentives in an economy with financial contracts. We concentrate on non-exclusive credit relationships, those where an entrepreneur can… (More)
We consider Common Agency games of moral hazard and we suggest that there is only a very weak support for the standard restriction to take-it or leave-it contracts.
In this paper we discuss the application of different co-payment rates to alternative medical strategies. Two such strategies are considered: a “vaccination strategy”, in which patients apply… (More)
In multiple principal multiple agent models of moral hazard, we consider whether the outcomes of equilibria in direct mechanisms are preserved when principals can offer indirect communication… (More)
This paper examines the role of the revelation principle in common agency games. We show how the introduction of a separability condition on the preferences of the agent is sufficient for the… (More)
We study games in which several principals design mechanisms in the presence of privately informed agents. Competition is exclusive: each type of each agent can participate with at most one principal… (More)
This note presents a counter-example to Theorems 3 and 4 in Peters .
We study competing mechanism games with principals simultaneously designing contracts to deal with agents. Following Epstein and Peters (1999), the traditional approach to characterize equilibrium… (More)
We consider multiple-principal multiple-agent games of incomplete information in which each agent can at most participate with one principal. In such contexts, we show that the restriction to direct… (More)
This paper examines the role of direct mechanisms in common agency games. We focus on deterministic contracts and show how the introduction of a separability condition on the preferences of the agent… (More)