• Publications
  • Influence
Constrained school choice
TLDR
We study the preference revelation game where students can only declare up to a fixed number of schools to be acceptable. Expand
  • 250
  • 27
  • PDF
Constrained School Choice: An Experimental Study
The literature on school choice assumes that families can submit a preference list over all the schools they want to be assigned to. However, in many real-life instances families are only allowed toExpand
  • 213
  • 24
  • PDF
Decentralized job matching
TLDR
We propose a multi-stage decentralized matching model where firms sequentially propose their (unique) positions to workers, and then workers each decide which, if any, offer to accept. Expand
  • 43
  • 7
  • PDF
A characterization of the single-peaked domain
TLDR
We provide in this paper two properties that are both necessary and sufficient to characterize the domain of single-peaked preference profiles. Expand
  • 68
  • 6
  • PDF
A new weight scheme for the Shapley value
TLDR
This paper proposes a new weight scheme for the Shapley value. Expand
  • 40
  • 4
  • PDF
More strategies, more Nash equilibria
TLDR
This short paper isolates a non-trivial class of games for which there exists a monotone relation between the size of pure strategy spaces and the number of pure Nash equilibria (Theorem). Expand
  • 24
  • 4
  • PDF
Bilateral commitment
TLDR
We consider non-cooperative environments in which two players have the power to gradually and unilaterally rule out some of their actions in a commitment phase that precedes the play of the game. Expand
  • 17
  • 4
  • PDF
Market Design: Auctions and Matching
TLDR
This book offers an introduction to market design, providing students with a broad overview of issues related to the design and analysis of market mechanisms. Expand
  • 15
  • 1
Weighted Myerson Value
TLDR
The Myerson value [Myerson, (1977)] is defined for TU games on communication graphs, which is shown to be equal to the weighted Shapley value. Expand
  • 16
  • 1
Two-sided matching with one-sided preferences
TLDR
In a school choice context we show that considering only schools' priorities and the set of acceptable schools for each student - but not how these schools are ranked in their preferences - we can restrict the list of possible stable matchings that can arise for any preference profile. Expand
  • 6
  • 1
  • PDF