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- Guillaume Haeringer, Flip Klijn
- J. Economic Theory
- 2009
Recently, several school districts in the US have adopted or consider adopting the Student-Optimal Stable mechanism or the Top Trading Cycles mechanism to assign children to public schools. There is… (More)
The literature on school choice assumes that families can submit a preference list over all the schools they want to be assigned to. However, in many real-life instances families are only allowed to… (More)
- Miguel A. Ballester, Guillaume Haeringer
- Social Choice and Welfare
- 2011
We provide in this paper a pair of properties that are both necessary and sufficient to characterize the domain of single-peaked preference profiles. This characterization allows for a definition of… (More)
- Guillaume Haeringer
- Mathematical Social Sciences
- 2006
It is well known since Owen (1968) that the weights in the weighted Shapley value cannot be interpreted as a measure of power (i.e., of the ability to bargain) of the players. This paper proposes a… (More)
- Sophie Bade, Guillaume Haeringer, Ludovic Renou
- J. Economic Theory
- 2007
In this paper, we isolate a non-trivial class of games for which there exists a monotone relation between the size of strategy spaces and the number of Nash equilibria. This class is that of… (More)
- Guillaume Haeringer, Myrna Holtz Wooders
- Int. J. Game Theory
- 2011
This paper studies a decentralized job market model where firms (academic departments) propose sequentially a (unique) position to some workers (Ph.D. candidates). Successful candidates then decide… (More)
- Guillaume Haeringer
- IGTR
- 1999
This paper studies the stability of a finite local public goods economy in horizontal differentiation, where a jurisdiction’s choice of the public good is given by an exogenous decision scheme. In… (More)
- Sophie Bade, Guillaume Haeringer, Ludovic Renou
- J. Economic Theory
- 2009
We consider non-cooperative environments in which two players have the power to commit but cannot sign binding agreements. We show that by committing to a set of actions rather than to a single… (More)