Guillaume Haeringer

Publications
Influence

Guillaume Haeringer, F. Klijn
Economics, Computer Science
J. Econ. Theory
1 September 2009

We study the preference revelation game where students can only declare up to a fixed number of schools to be acceptable. Expand

Constrained School Choice: An Experimental Study

Caterina Calsamiglia, Guillaume Haeringer, F. Klijn
Psychology, Economics
1 September 2010

The literature on school choice assumes that families can submit a preference list over all the schools they want to be assigned to. However, in many real-life instances families are only allowed to… Expand

Decentralized job matching

Guillaume Haeringer, M. Wooders
Economics, Computer Science
Int. J. Game Theory
1 February 2011

We propose a multi-stage decentralized matching model where firms sequentially propose their (unique) positions to workers, and then workers each decide which, if any, offer to accept. Expand

A characterization of the single-peaked domain

M. I. Ballester, Guillaume Haeringer
Mathematics, Computer Science
Soc. Choice Welf.
1 February 2011

We provide in this paper two properties that are both necessary and sufficient to characterize the domain of single-peaked preference profiles. Expand

A new weight scheme for the Shapley value

Guillaume Haeringer
Mathematics, Computer Science
Math. Soc. Sci.
1 July 2006

This paper proposes a new weight scheme for the Shapley value. Expand

More strategies, more Nash equilibria

Sophie Bade, Guillaume Haeringer, L. Renou
Economics, Computer Science
J. Econ. Theory
1 July 2007

This short paper isolates a non-trivial class of games for which there exists a monotone relation between the size of pure strategy spaces and the number of pure Nash equilibria (Theorem). Expand

Bilateral commitment

Sophie Bade, Guillaume Haeringer, L. Renou
Computer Science
J. Econ. Theory
2009

We consider non-cooperative environments in which two players have the power to gradually and unilaterally rule out some of their actions in a commitment phase that precedes the play of the game. Expand

Market Design: Auctions and Matching

Guillaume Haeringer
Computer Science
23 February 2018

This book offers an introduction to market design, providing students with a broad overview of issues related to the design and analysis of market mechanisms. Expand

Weighted Myerson Value

Guillaume Haeringer
Mathematics, Computer Science
IGTR
1 June 1999

The Myerson value [Myerson, (1977)] is defined for TU games on communication graphs, which is shown to be equal to the weighted Shapley value. Expand

Two-sided matching with one-sided preferences

Guillaume Haeringer, Vincent Iehlé
Mathematics, Computer Science
EC
1 June 2014

In a school choice context we show that considering only schools' priorities and the set of acceptable schools for each student - but not how these schools are ranked in their preferences - we can restrict the list of possible stable matchings that can arise for any preference profile. Expand

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