Learn More
In May 1995, an international team characterized and contained an outbreak of Ebola hemorrhagic fever (EHF) in Kikwit, Democratic Republic of the Congo. Active surveillance was instituted using several methods, including house-to-house search, review of hospital and dispensary logs, interview of health care personnel, retrospective contact tracing, and(More)
We conducted two antibody surveys to assess risk factors for Marburg hemorrhagic fever in an area of confirmed Marburg virus transmission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Questionnaires were administered and serum samples tested for Marburg-specific antibodies by enzyme-linked immunosorbent assay. Fifteen (2%) of 912 participants in a general(More)
The framework of the newly revised International Health Regulations is a key driver in the effort to strengthen global public health security. Unanimously agreed upon by the World Health Assembly on May 23, 2005, the regulations are the result of experience gained and lessons learned during the past 30 years. This global legal framework includes a(More)
Blood samples from 740 Egyptian Nationals working in the tourism industry at two sites in the South Sinai governorate were screened for markers of infection with hepatitis B virus (HBV), hepatitis C virus (HCV), human immunodeficiency virus (HIV), and Treponema pallidum. Study subjects included 467 individuals from a rural seashore tourist village and 273(More)
From October 1991 to February 1992, an outbreak of acute fever (in which thick blood films were negative for malaria) spread rapidly in the city of Djibouti, Djibouti Republic, affecting all age groups and both nationals and foreigners. The estimated number of cases was 12,000. The clinical features were consistent with a non-haemorrhagic dengue-like(More)
The outbreak of Ebola hemorrhagic fever in Kikwit, Democratic Republic of the Congo, clearly signaled an end to the days when physicians and researchers could work in relative obscurity on problems of international importance, and it provided many lessons to the international public health and scientific communities. In particular, the outbreak signaled a(More)
the assumption that a new and emerging infection–one that had not yet demonstrated its full epidemiologic potential but was spreading from person to person and continent to conti-nent–could be prevented from becoming endemic. Within 4 months after the first global alert about the new disease, all known chains of transmission had been interrupted in an(More)
The resurgence of the microbial threat, rooted in several recent trends, has increased the vulnerability of all nations to the risk of infectious diseases, whether newly emerging, well-established, or deliberately caused. Infectious disease intelligence, gleaned through sensitive surveillance, is the best defence. The epidemiological and laboratory(More)
Emerging infectious diseases and the growth of information technology have produced new demands and possibilities for disease surveillance and response. Increasing numbers of outbreak reports must be assessed rapidly so that control efforts can be initiated and unsubstantiated reports can be identified to protect countries from unnecessary economic damage.(More)