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We compare three common dispute resolution processes — negotiation, mediation, and arbitration — in the framework of Crawford and Sobel (1982). Under negotiation, the two parties engage in (possibly arbitrarily long) face-to-face cheap talk. Under mediation, the parties communicate with a neutral third party who makes a non-binding recommendation. Under(More)
a r t i c l e i n f o a b s t r a c t We analyze the performance of various communication protocols in a generalization of the Crawford–Sobel (1982) model of cheap talk that allows for multiple receivers. We find that the sender prefers communicating by private messages if the receivers' average bias is high, and by public messages if the receivers' average(More)
HIV-seropositive blacks, Hispanics, women of all ethnicities, and injection drug users (IDUs) have low rates of clinical trial participation. The opinions of research nurses and study coordinators as potential facilitators and barriers to access to clinical trials may contribute to this disparity. Study coordinators and research nurses from the adult AIDS(More)
BACKGROUND AND OBJECTIVE The reasons for minority underrepresentation in HIV/AIDS clinical trials remain unclear. We aimed to evaluate the knowledge, experience, and factors that influence minority participation in HIV/AIDS studies in the United States. METHODS An anonymous, bilingual, self-administered survey on study participation was given to(More)
We study what kind of equilibria of which mechanisms are ex post renegotiation-proof (EPRP), i.e., robust against the possibility of ex post renegotiation under a variety of renegotiation procedures, and which social choice functions are EPRP implementable. In complete information environments with two agents only budget balanced Groves allocations are EPRP(More)
A mechanism is said to be renegotiation-proof if it is robust against renegotiation both before and after it is played. We ask (1) what kind of environments admit the renegotiation-proof implementation of some social choice rules? (2) for a given environment , what kind of social choice rule are implementable in a way that is renegotiation-proof? and (3)(More)
We study communication in a static Cournot duopoly model under the assumption that firms have unverifiable private information about their costs. We show that cheap talk between the firms cannot transmit any information. However, if the firms can communicate through a third party, communication can be informative even when it is not substantiated by any(More)