Gonzalo Olcina

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This article provides an explanation of the evolution and persistence of the women’s segregation in jobs with less on-the-job training opportunities within the framework of an overlapping generations model with intergenerational transmission of preferences. Job-priority and family-priority preferences are considered. Firms policy and the distribution of(More)
This paper analyzes the long-run strategic relationship between a firm and a union as a repeated bargaining game, where there is incomplete information on the player’s motivation on both sides and each party has a fall-back position. The firm and the union will engage in a reputation-building activity, that will produce a limited number of strikes over(More)
Consider an organization composed by a Leader and by a finite group of agents (or followers). The Leader has some ideal organization composition or vector of preferred actions one for each agent and can invest in costly socialization trying to instill this “corporate culture” in all the agents of the organization. Each agent has as well her ideal action.(More)
We consider a model where each individual (or ethnic minority) is embedded in a network of relationships and decides whether or not she wants to be assimilated to the majority norm. Each individual wants her behavior to agree with her personal ideal action or norm but also wants her behavior to be as close as possible to the average assimilation behavior of(More)
This note presents a new result on incomplete contracts. We show that if the different degrees of relation−specificity of the partnerts’ investments determines their ex post bargaining position (what Williamson (1985) calls “the fundamental transformation”), it will appear a potential coordination failure. Under plausible conditions, the parties will(More)
The horizon of a bargaining game is an important factor in determining the outcome of a negotiation process. There exist situations in which a last period is not perceived, i.e, infinite horizon games. On the contrary, there are negotiations in which the final period determines, from the beginning of the game, the strategic behavior of the players. However,(More)
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