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An open-economy equilibrium model is derived to investigate the effects of energy policy on the U.S. economy, with emphasis on corn-based ethanol. A second best policy of a fuel tax and ethanol subsidy is found to approximate fairly closely the welfare gains associated with the first best policy of an optimal carbon tax and tariffs on traded goods. The(More)
The quest for biorenewable energy sources is held to justify a number of government interventions, including support policies for biofuels such as those responsible for the recent rapid growth of US ethanol production. This article provides an analytical assessment of such policies. We construct a general equilibrium, open economy model that captures the(More)
A partial equilibrium four-region world trade model for the soybean complex is developed in which Roundup Ready (RR) products are weakly inferior substitutes to conventional ones, RR seeds are priced at a premium, and costly segregation is necessary to separate conventional and biotech products. Solution of the calibrated model illustrates how incomplete(More)
The economics of geographical indications (GIs) is assessed within a vertical product differentiation framework that is consistent with the competitive structure of agriculture. It is assumed that certification costs are needed for GIs to serve as (collective) credible quality certification devices, and production of high-quality product is endogenously(More)
We consider a model in which an innovating monopolist of a technologically superior intermediate input must sell this product to final output producers. Prior research shows that, with complete information, the monopolist's optimal strategy will lead to complete adoption of this technologically superior innovation. In this article we show that, when the(More)
This paper studies how the strength of intellectual property rights (IPRs) affects investments in biological innovations when the value of an innovation is stochastically reduced to zero because of the evolution of pest resistance. We frame the problem as a research and development (R&D) investment game in a duopoly model of sequential innovation. We(More)