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We consider expansions of the Abadi-Rogaway logic of indistinguishability of formal cryptographic expressions. We expand the logic in order to cover cases when partial information of the encrypted plaintext is revealed. We consider not only computational, but also purely probabilistic, information-theoretic interpretations. We present a general, systematic… (More)

Both the formal and the computational models of cryptography contain the notion of message equivalence or indistinguishability. An encryption scheme provides soundness for indistinguishability if, when mapping formal messages into the computational model, equivalent formal messages are mapped to indistinguishable computational distributions. Previous… (More)

In the investigation of the relationship between the formal and the computational view of cryptography, a recent approach, first proposed in [10], uses static equivalence from cryptographic pi calculi as a notion of formal indistinguishability. Previous work [10, 1] has shown that this yields the soundness of natural interpretations of some interesting… (More)

We consider the question of the adequacy of symbolic models versus computational models for the verification of security protocols. We neither try to include properties in the symbolic model that reflect the properties of the computational primitives nor add computational requirements that enforce the sound-ness of the symbolic model. We propose in this… (More)

In their seminal work, Abadi and Rogaway [2, 3] show that the formal (Dolev-Yao) notion of indistinguishability is sound with respect to the computational model: messages that are indistinguishable in the formal model become indistinguishable messages in the computational model. However, this result leaves two problems unsolved. First, it cannot tolerate… (More)

We present a computationally sound first-order system for security-analysis of protocols that places secrecy of nonces and keys in its center. Even trace properties such as agreement and authentication are proven via proving a non-trace property, namely, secrecy first with an induc-tive method. This results a very powerful system, the working of which we… (More)

Recently, Bana and Comon-Lundh introduced the notion of computationally complete symbolic attacker to deliver unconditional computational soundness to symbolic protocol verification. First we explain the relationship between their technique and Fitting's embedding of classical logic into S4. Then, based on predicates for "key usability", we provide an… (More)

We show that the recent technique of computationally complete symbolic attackers proposed by Bana and Comon-Lundh [6] for computationally sound verification of security protocols is powerful enough to verify actual protocols. In their work, Bana and Comon-Lundh presented only the general framework, but they did not introduce sufficiently many axioms to… (More)

This paper is concerned about relating formal and computational models of cryptography in case of active adversaries when formal security analysis is done with first order logic. We first argue that the way Datta et al. defined computational semantics to their Protocol Composition Logic gives rise to problems because of focusing on occurrences of… (More)