George J. Stigler

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The potential usex of public resources and powers to improve the economic stuius of economic groups (such as industries and occupations) are analyzed to provide a scheme of the demand for regulation. The characteristics of the political process which allow relatively small groups to obtain such regulation is then sketched lo provide elemenls of a theory of(More)
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We document that ownership by officers and directors of publicly-traded firms is on average higher today than earlier in the century. Managerial ownership rises from 13 percent for the universe of exchange-listed corporations in 1935, the earliest year for which such data exist, to 21 percent in 1995. We examine in detail the robustness of the increase and(More)
  • Randall S. Kroszner, Philip E. Strahan, +6 authors John M . Olin
  • 2000
This paper provides a positive political economy analysis one of the most important revisions of the U.S. supervision and regulation system during the last two decades, the 1991 Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act (FDICIA). We analyze the impact of private interest groups as well as political-institutional factors on the voting patterns on(More)
Using property-rights tools, this paper develops a theory of the transition from despotic to rule-of-law regimes, relying on the notion that rulers and subjects are interested in maximizing wealth. Keeping subjects in check enhances despots’ internal security, but at the cost of lower output, and of less wealth for the despots. Enhanced wealth is especially(More)
This paper investigates how changes in both institutional incentives and economic interests are important for securing durable changes in economic policy. We study how bipartisan support developed to sustain the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act (RTAA) of 1934, which fundamentally transformed U.S. trade policy. The durability of this change was achieved only(More)
* Bolton: 310k Business Admin Building, Smeal College of Business, Penn State University, University Park, PA 16802, USA; geb3@psu.edu. Ockenfels: Max Planck Institute for Research into Economic Systems, Strategic Interaction Unit, Kahlaische Str. 10, D-07745 Jena, Germany; ockenfels@mpiew-jena.mpg.de. Ockenfels gratefully acknowledges financial support(More)
The economic approach to politics revolutionized the way scholars in economics and political science approached the study of political decision-making by introducing the possibility of government failure. However, the persistent and consistent application of neoclassical models of economics also seemed to suggest that once the full costs were accounted for,(More)