George J. Mailath

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Repeated Games and Reputations is primarily about infinitely repeated interactions, where players play a fixed stage game in every period and discount future payoffs. All three ingredients of this canonical setting are very well, and very beautifully, motivated. As argued in Osborne and Rubinstein, players may entirely ignore, in their strategic thinking,(More)
We extend Kreps’ (1979) analysis of preference for flexibility, reinterpreted by Kreps (1992) as a model of unforeseen contingencies. We enrich the choice set, consequently obtaining uniqueness results that were not possible in Kreps’ model. We consider several representations and allow the agent to prefer commitment in some contingencies. In the(More)
Suppose that n buyers each want one unit and m sellers each have one or more units of a good. Sellers post prices, and then buyers choose sellers. In symmetric equilibrium, similar sellers all post one price, and buyers randomize. Hence, more or fewer buyers may arrive than a seller can accommodate. We call this frictions. We solve for prices and the(More)
1 This is a substantial revision of ‘‘Repeated Games with Imperfect Private Monitoring: Notes on a Coordination Perspective.’’ That paper was written while Mailath was visiting the Australian National University and Morris was visiting Northwestern University: we thank both institutions for their hospitality. We thank Drew Fudenberg, Michihiro Kandori, and(More)
We study the long-run sustainability of reputations in games with imperfect public monitoring. It is impossible to maintain a permanent reputation for playing a strategy that does not eventually play an equilibrium of the game without uncertainty about types. Thus, a player cannot indefinitely sustain a reputation for non-credible behavior in the presence(More)
The first displayed equation is a new requirement, while the second displayed equation tightens the previous condition that φ′ ∈ (0, 1 − λ) (note that ρ/[ρ + λ(1 − ρ)] < 1 − λ). Both conditions hold if λ and φ′ are not too large, which is the case we have in mind. The first addition ensures that the slope of φ(φ|g) with respect to φ, evaluated at zero, is(More)
This paper investigates a new class of 2-player games in continuous time, in which the players’ observations of each other’s actions are distorted by Brownian motions. These games are analogous to repeated games with imperfect monitoring in which the players take actions frequently. Using a differential equation we find the set E(r) of payoff pairs(More)
Do investors making complementary investments face the correct incen­ tives, especially when they cannot contract with each other prior to their de­ cisions? We present a two-sided matching model in which buyers and sellers make investments prior to matching. Once matched, buyer and seller bar­ gain over the price, taking into account outside options.(More)
Some private-monitoring games, that is, games with no public histories, have histories that are almost public. These games are the natural result of perturbing public-monitoring games towards private monitoring. We explore the extent to which it is possible to coordinate continuation play in such games. It is always possible to coordinate continuation play(More)