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Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use. Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that… (More)

Note: Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers are preliminary materials circulated to stimulate discussion and critical comment. Requests for single copies of a Paper will be filled by the Cowles Foundation within the limits of the supply. References in publications to Discussion Papers (other than mere acknowledgment by a writer that he has access to such… (More)

We study the long-run sustainability of reputations in games with imperfect public monitoring. It is impossible to maintain a permanent reputation for playing a strategy that does not eventually play an equilibrium of the game without uncertainty about types. Thus, a player cannot indefinitely sustain a reputation for non-credible behavior in the presence… (More)

A strategy profile in a repeated game has bounded recall L if play under the profile after two distinct histories that agree in the last L periods is equal. Mailath and Morris (2002, 2006) proved that any strict equilibrium in bounded-recall strategies of a game with full support public monitoring is robust to all perturbations of the monitoring structure… (More)

We describe the maximum efficient subgame perfect equilibrium payoff for a player in the repeated Prisoners' Dilemma, as a function of the discount factor. For discount factors above a critical level, every efficient, feasible, individually rational payoff profile can be sustained. For an open and dense subset of discount factors below the critical value,… (More)

We examine contemporaneous perfect ε-equilibria, in which a player's actions after every history, evaluated at the point of deviation from the equilibrium, must be within ε of a best response. This concept implies, but is stronger than, Radner's ex ante perfect ε-equilibrium. A strategy profile is a contemporaneous perfect ε-equilibrium of a game if it is a… (More)

- Eduardo Faingold, Yuliy Sannikov, Daron Acemoglu, Martin Cripps, Kyna Fong, Drew Fudenberg +6 others
- 2010

We study reputation dynamics in continuous-time games in which a large player (e.g. government) faces a population of small players (e.g. households) and the large player's actions are imperfectly observable. The major part of our analysis examines the case in which public signals about the large player's actions are distorted by a Brownian motion and the… (More)

For games of public reputation with uncertainty over types and imperfect public monitoring, Cripps, Mailath, and Samuelson (2004) showed that an informed player facing short-lived uninformed opponents cannot maintain a permanent reputation for playing a strategy that is not part of an equilibrium of the game without uncertainty over types. This paper… (More)

- V Bhaskar, George J Mailath, Stephen Morris
- 2009

We study perfect information games with an infinite horizon played by an arbitrary number of players. This class of games includes infinitely repeated perfect information games, repeated games with asyn-chronous moves, games with long and short run players, games with overlapping generations of players, and canonical non-cooperative models of bargaining. We… (More)