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- Publications
- Influence
Stock Pyramids, Cross-Ownership, and Dual Class Equity: The Creation and Agency Costs of Separating Control from Cash Flow Rights
- L. Bebchuk, Reinier H. Kraakman, George G. Triantis
- Business
- 1 February 1999
This paper examines common arrangements for separating control from cash flow rights: stock pyramids, cross-ownership structures, and dual class equity structures. We describe the ways in which such… Expand
Concentrated Corporate Ownership: Stock Pyramids, Cross-Ownership, and Dual Class Equity: The Mechanisms and Agency Costs of Separating Control from Cash-Flow Rights
- L. Bebchuk, Reinier H. Kraakman, George G. Triantis
- Business
- 2000
- 234
- 30
- PDF
The Role of Debt in Interactive Corporate Governance
- George G. Triantis, R. Daniels
- Business
- 1 July 1995
Most of the corporate governance literature rests on a premise that the interests of various stakeholder groups conflict and that managerial loyalty is more likely to be captured by shareholders than… Expand
Investing in Human Capital: The Efficiency of Covenants Not to Compete
- E. Posner, George G. Triantis, Alexander J. Triantis
- Business
- 1 January 2004
Covenants not to compete (CNCs) are used in employment contracts to prevent employees from working for other employers. The legal enforcement of CNCs varies across jurisdictions in the U.S.: some… Expand
Market Conditions and Contract Design: Variations in Debt Contracting
- Albert H. Choi, George G. Triantis
- Business
- 26 February 2013
Scholars have cataloged rigidities in contract design. Some have observed that boilerplate provisions are remarkably resistant to change, even in the face of shocks such as adverse judicial… Expand
Strategic Vagueness in Contract Design: The Case of Corporate Acquisitions
- Albert H. Choi, George G. Triantis
- Business
- 3 April 2009
The unprecedented and unanticipated economic and financial shocks of the past couple of years have led parties to look for contractual escapes from deals. Some parties exercise options embedded in… Expand
Financial Contract Design in the World of Venture Capital
- George G. Triantis
- Business, Economics
- 1 February 2001
Recent scholarship has described a venture capital cycle which finances start-up technology companies. This cycle, however, bears striking similarities with its counterpart in the old economy under… Expand
Anticipating Litigation in Contract Design
- R. Scott, George G. Triantis
- Economics
- 2006
Contract theory does not address the question of how parties design contracts under the existing adversarial system, which relies on the parties to establish relevant facts indirectly by the use of… Expand
Completing Contracts in the Shadow of Costly Verification
- Albert H. Choi, George G. Triantis
- Economics
- 18 November 2007
Abstract Contract theory typically holds that verification costs are obstacles to complete contracting; yet real‐world contracts often contain provisions that seem costly to verify. We show how… Expand
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