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Stock Pyramids, Cross-Ownership, and Dual Class Equity: The Creation and Agency Costs of Separating Control from Cash Flow Rights
This paper examines common arrangements for separating control from cash flow rights: stock pyramids, cross-ownership structures, and dual class equity structures. We describe the ways in which suchExpand
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The Role of Debt in Interactive Corporate Governance
Most of the corporate governance literature rests on a premise that the interests of various stakeholder groups conflict and that managerial loyalty is more likely to be captured by shareholders thanExpand
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Investing in Human Capital: The Efficiency of Covenants Not to Compete
Covenants not to compete (CNCs) are used in employment contracts to prevent employees from working for other employers. The legal enforcement of CNCs varies across jurisdictions in the U.S.: someExpand
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Market Conditions and Contract Design: Variations in Debt Contracting
Scholars have cataloged rigidities in contract design. Some have observed that boilerplate provisions are remarkably resistant to change, even in the face of shocks such as adverse judicialExpand
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Strategic Vagueness in Contract Design: The Case of Corporate Acquisitions
The unprecedented and unanticipated economic and financial shocks of the past couple of years have led parties to look for contractual escapes from deals. Some parties exercise options embedded inExpand
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Financial Contract Design in the World of Venture Capital
Recent scholarship has described a venture capital cycle which finances start-up technology companies. This cycle, however, bears striking similarities with its counterpart in the old economy underExpand
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Anticipating Litigation in Contract Design
Contract theory does not address the question of how parties design contracts under the existing adversarial system, which relies on the parties to establish relevant facts indirectly by the use ofExpand
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Completing Contracts in the Shadow of Costly Verification
Abstract Contract theory typically holds that verification costs are obstacles to complete contracting; yet real‐world contracts often contain provisions that seem costly to verify. We show howExpand
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