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Using data on one-shot games, we investigate the assumption that players respond to underlying expectations about their opponent's behavior. In our laboratory experiments, subjects play a set of 14 two-person 3x3 games, and state first order beliefs about their opponent's behavior. The sets of responses in the two tasks are largely inconsistent. Rather, we(More)
and two anonymous referees for their helpful comments and input, as well as other participants in the Pull Mechanisms Working Group of the Global Health Policy Research Network, a program of the Center for Global Development supported by the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation. We are especially grateful to Henry Grabowski for his generosity in sharing the(More)
In this paper, we ask whether variation in preference anomalies is related to variation in cognitive ability. Evidence from a new laboratory study of Chilean high school students shows that small-stakes risk aversion and short-run discounting are less common among those with higher standardized test scores, although anomalies persist even among the(More)
In many field settings, participants sort among environments based on their preferences , beliefs, and skills. Experiments, however, often ignore the potential impact of such sorting. We demonstrate the importance of sorting for experiments, in the domain of social preferences. When individuals are constrained to play a dictator game, 61% of the subjects(More)
We consider a decisionmaker who "narrowly brackets", i.e. evaluates her decisions separately. Generalizing an example by Tversky and Kahneman (1981) we show that if the decisionmaker does not have constant-absolute-risk-averse preferences, there exists a simple pair of independent binary decisions where she will make a …rst-order stochastically dominated(More)
Any opinions expressed here are those of the author(s) and not those of the institute. Research disseminated by IZA may include views on policy, but the institute itself takes no institutional policy positions. The Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) in Bonn is a local and virtual international research center and a place of communication between(More)
Any opinions expressed here are those of the author(s) and not those of IZA. Research published in this series may include views on policy, but the institute itself takes no institutional policy positions. The Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) in Bonn is a local and virtual international research center and a place of communication between science,(More)
A key open question for theories of reference-dependent preferences is what determines the reference point. One candidate is expectations: what people expect could affect how they feel about what actually occurs. In a real-effort experiment, we manipulate the rational expectations of subjects and check whether this manipulation influences their effort(More)
We examine the robustness of information cascades in laboratory experiments. Apart from the situation in which each player can obtain a signal for free (as in the experiment by Anderson and Holt, 1997, American Economic Review), the case of costly signals is studied where players decide whether to obtain private information or not, at a small but positive(More)
We are especially grateful to Henry Grabowski for his generosity in sharing the pharmaceutical sales revenue data with us. All errors and opinions are those of the authors. The views expressed herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Bureau of Economic Research. All rights reserved. Short sections of text,(More)