ERC: A Theory of Equity, Reciprocity, and Competition
We demonstrate that a simple model, constructed on the premise that people are motivated by both their pecuniary payoff and their relative payoff standing, organizes a large and seemingly disparate…
A Comparative Model of Bargaining: Theory and Evidence
- Gary E. Bolton
Recent laboratory studies of alternating-offer bargaining find many empirical regularities that are inconsistent with the standard theory. In this paper, the author postulates that bargainers behave…
Learning-by-Doing in the Newsvendor Problem: A Laboratory Investigation of the Role of Experience and Feedback
We investigate learning by doing in the newsvendor inventory problem. An earlier study observed that decision makers tend to anchor their orders around average demand and fail to adjust sufficiently…
Fair Procedures: Evidence from Games Involving Lotteries
It is found that an unbiased random procedure is an acceptable substitute for an unbiased allocation: similar patterns of acceptance and rejection result when either is inserted as a feasible proposal in a sequential battle-of-the-sexes.
Engineering Trust: Reciprocity in the Production of Reputation Information
Guided by feedback patterns observed on eBay and other platforms, laboratory experiments are run to investigate how reciprocity can be managed by changes in the way feedback information flows through the system, leading to more accurate reputation information, more trust, and more efficient trade.
Anonymity versus Punishment in Ultimatum Bargaining
Abstract Previous investigations have shown that laboratory play of the ultimatum game differs from the perfect equilibrium prediction. The anonymity hypothesis attributes this to a distortion of…
Individual Preferences for Giving ∗
We utilize graphical representations of Dictator Games which generate rich individual-level data. Our baseline experiment employs budget sets over feasible payoff-pairs. We test these data for…
How Effective are Online Reputation Mechanisms? An Experimental Study
It is found that while the feedback mechanism induces quite a substantial improvement in transaction efficiency, it also exhibits a kind of public goods problem in that, unlike in the partners market, the benefits of trust and trustworthy behavior go to the whole community and are not completely internalized.
Dictator game giving: Rules of fairness versus acts of kindness
A hypothetical decision procedure is proposed, based on the notion that dictator giving originates with personal and social rules that effectively constrain self-interested behavior, that provides a link between dictator behavior and a broader class of laboratory phenomena.
Managers and Students as Newsvendors
It is found that managers broadly exhibit the same kind of pull-to-center bias as students do and use information and task training no better than students.