Gani Aldashev

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Why many large non-governmental organizations (NGOs) are becoming multinational entities? What are the welfare implications of this integration of markets for development donations? To answer these questions, we build a simple two-country model with horizontally di¤erentiated NGOs competing through fundraising e¤ort. We …nd that NGOs become multinational if(More)
Randomized controlled trials (RCT) have become a dominant empirical tool in applied economics. The internal validity of RCTs crucially depends on the (implicit) assumption that the procedure assigning subjects to treatment and control groups has no effect on behavior. We show theoretically that this assumption is violated when people are motivated by(More)
Empowerment of disadvantaged groups of population is a key issue in development. One major difficulty in implementing progressive legal reforms arises from the persistent and contrary influence of custom. In this paper, we present a simple theoretical framework that analyzes how customary rules evolve under the impact of a change in formal law. This(More)
Better legal institutions favor economic development, but only in States with sufficiently constrained executive power. We document this novel pattern across developing countries, and build a simple model that illustrates how power, and the institutions that constrain or complement it, may affect development. We show that there is a tradeoff between the two(More)
We build a simple model to show why the unemployed vote for employment protection. An unemployed individual who nds a job might face a credit constraint: the bank fears that the individual might lose his job and not repay the loan. Credit constraints for newly employed individuals become more severe as employment protection decreases. A decrease in(More)
We model political information acquisition in large elections, where the probability of being pivotal is negligible. Our model builds on the assumption that informed citizens enjoy discussing politics with other informed citizens. The resulting information acquisition game exhibits strategic complementarities. We …nd that information acquisition depends(More)
We study the informational efficiency of a market with a single traded asset. The price initially differs from the fundamental value, about which the agents have noisy private information (which is, on average, correct). A fraction of traders revise their price expectations in each period. The price at which the asset is traded is public information. The(More)
We consider redistributional taxation between people with and without human capital if education is endogenous and if individuals differ in their perceptions about own ability. Those who see their ability as low like redistributive taxation because of the transfers it generates. Those who see their ability as high may also like redistributive taxation(More)
a r t i c l e i n f o Globalization has been accompanied by rising pressure from advocacy non-governmental organizations (NGOs) on multinational firms to act in socially-responsible manner. We analyze how NGO pressure interacts with industry structure, using a simple model of NGO-firm interaction embedded in an industry environment with endogenous markups(More)