Gabriele K. Lünser

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A compelling body of evidence indicates that observing a task-irrelevant action makes the execution of that action more likely. However, it remains unclear whether this 'automatic imitation' effect is indeed automatic or whether the imitative action is voluntary. The present study tested the automaticity of automatic imitation by asking whether it occurs in(More)
We experimentally examine the effects of flexible and fixed prices in markets for experience goods in which demand is driven by trust. With flexible prices, we observe low prices and high quality in competitive (oligopolistic) markets, and high prices coupled with low quality in non-competitive (monopolistic) markets. We then introduce a regulated(More)
Price Competition and Reputation in Markets for Experience Goods: An Experimental Study* We experimentally examine the effects of price competition in markets for experience goods where sellers can build up reputations for quality. We compare price competition to monopolistic markets and markets where prices are exogenously fixed (somewhere between the(More)
We study the effects of reputation and competition in a stylized market for experience goods. If interaction is anonymous, such markets perform poorly: sellers are not trustworthy, and buyers do not trust sellers. If sellers are identifiable and can, hence, build a reputation, efficiency quadruples but is still at only a third of the first best. Adding more(More)
We consider a simple tournament model with two stages and compare two information conditions: Either intermediate information on the subjects’ relative positions after the first stage is available or it is not. According to our theoretical predictions, equilibrium behavior in both stages is not affected by intermediate information. In laboratory(More)
Arguing that consumers are the carriers of firms’ reputations, we examine the role of consumer networks for trust in markets that suffer from moral hazard. When consumers are embedded in a network, they can exchange information with their neighbors about their private experiences with different sellers. We find that such information exchange fosters firms'(More)
References ml#ref-list-1 http://rspb.royalsocietypublishing.org/content/early/2011/07/12/rspb.2011.1024.full.ht This article cites 37 articles, 10 of which can be accessed free P<P Published online 20 July 2011 in advance of the print journal. Subject collections (556 articles) cognition • (2149 articles) behaviour • (538 articles) neuroscience •(More)
Often information structures are such that while individual reputation building is impossible groups of agents would have the opportunity of building up a reputation. We experimentally examine whether groups of sellers in markets that suffer from moral hazard are able to build up reputations and, thus, avoid market breakdown. We contrast our findings with(More)
mirror neuron system 30 31  Cook: conducted experimental sessions; contributed to the data analysis and interpretation; wrote the first draft of the paper. Bird: contributed to the design of the experiment; conducted experimental sessions. Lünser: contributed to the design, data analysis and second draft of the paper. Huck: provided the idea for the study;(More)
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