• Publications
  • Influence
On optimal single-item auctions
TLDR
We revisit the problem of designing the profit-maximizing single-item auction, solved by Myerson in his seminal paper for the case in which bidder valuations are independently distributed. Expand
  • 72
  • 8
On the Complexity of Dynamic Mechanism Design
TLDR
We introduce a dynamic mechanism design problem in which the designer wants to offer for sale an item to an agent, and another item to the same agent at some point in the future. Expand
  • 35
  • 4
  • PDF
On the Competitive Ratio of Online Sampling Auctions
TLDR
We study online profit-maximizing auctions for digital goods with adversarial bid selection and uniformly random arrivals. Expand
  • 14
  • 2
Psychological distress and physical disability in patients sustaining severe injuries in road traffic crashes: Results from a one-year cohort study from three European countries.
The current study aimed to follow-up a group of road crash survivors for one year and assesses the impact of injury on their psychological and physical condition. All crash survivors that wereExpand
  • 17
  • 2
Simple, Optimal and Efficient Auctions
TLDR
We study the extent to which simple auctions can simultaneously achieve good revenue and efficiency guarantees in single-item settings, when the bidders' values are drawn from independent, not necessarily identical, regular distributions. Expand
  • 24
  • 1
  • PDF
Biobjective Online Bipartite Matching
TLDR
We introduce a new problem of Biobjective Online Bipartite Matching which captures this motivation. Expand
  • 11
  • 1
  • PDF
Optimal deterministic auctions with correlated priors
TLDR
We revisit the problem of designing the profit-maximizing single-item auction, solved by Myerson in his seminal paper on optimal auction design. Expand
  • 7
  • 1
  • PDF
The Intractability of Dynamic Mechanism Design
TLDR
We introduce a dynamic mechanism design problem in which the designer wants to offer for sale an item to an agent, and another item to the same agent at some point in the future. Expand
  • 3
  • 1
On Learning Algorithms for Nash Equilibria
TLDR
We show via a potential function argument that in a variety of settings the multiplicative updates algorithm impressively fails to find the unique Nash equilibrium, in that the cumulative distributions of players produced by learning dynamics actually drift away from the equilibrium. Expand
  • 48
  • PDF
Efficiency-Revenue Trade-Offs in Auctions
TLDR
We address the natural question of trade-offs between the two criteria, that is, auctions that optimize, say, revenue under the constraint that the welfare is above a given level. Expand
  • 21
  • PDF