Managerial Dilemmas: The Political Economy of Hierarchy.
List of tables and figures Series editors' preface Acknowledgements Part I. Why Have Hierarchy?: 1. Market failures and hierarchical solutions: the tension between individual and social rationality…
THE POLITICAL EVOLUTION OF PRINCIPAL-AGENT MODELS
- G. Miller
- Economics
- 6 May 2005
▪ Abstract With tools borrowed from the economic analysis of insurance, principal-agency theory has allowed political scientists new insights into the role of information asymmetry and incentives in…
Cities by Contract: The Politics of Municipal Incorporation
- G. Miller
- History
- 23 January 1981
The battle line in the urban conflict lies between the central city and the affluent suburb. The city, needing to broaden its tax base in order to provide increasingly necessary social services, has…
Above Politics: Credible Commitment and Efficiency in the Design of Public Agencies
- G. Miller
- Economics
- 1 April 2000
The state has, since its origins, been characterized both by the production of public goods and a competition for the surplus benefits generated by the creation of those goods. Holmstrom 's (1982)…
Bureaucrats, Legislators, and the Size of Government
Some recent theories have blamed the growth of government on budget-maximizing bureaucrats who are assumedly capable of imposing their most preferred budget-output combination on legislatures,…
Activists and Partisan Realignment in the United States
- G. Miller, N. Schofield
- Political ScienceAmerican Political Science Review
- 1 May 2003
In this paper, we contend that party realignments occur due to the interaction of candidates and activists. We examine independent party candidates who are motivated primarily to win elections but…
Order with Some Law: Complementarity vs. Substitution of Formal and Informal Arrangements
- S. Lazzarini, G. Miller, Todd R. Zenger
- Economics
- 1 December 2001
While some argue that incomplete incentive contracts facilitate the self-enforcement of informal dealings, other authors submit that they substitute for or "crowd out" social norms supporting…
Dealing with the Paradox of Embeddedness: The Role of Contracts and Trust in Facilitating Movement Out of Committed Relationships
- S. Lazzarini, G. Miller, Todd R. Zenger
- EconomicsOrgan. Sci.
- 1 October 2006
Experimental evidence is presented largely consistent with the theory of the interplay between formal and informal mechanisms in the determination of social mobility that trust in general others reduces participants’ perception of hazards in market exchanges, and hence promotes transactions among strangers.
“A Theory Waiting to Be Discovered and Used”: A Reanalysis of Canonical Experiments on Majority-Rule Decision Making
- W. Bianco, M. S. Lynch, G. Miller, I. Sened
- EconomicsJournal of Politics
- 1 November 2006
The paper offers a reassessment of canonical attempts to address a fundamental question about majority rule: what is the relationship between the preferences held by the participants and the outcomes…
The Impact of Economics on Contemporary Political Science
- G. Miller
- Political Science
- 1997
Early economic models assumed that the maximizing behavior of individual actors was the primary determinant of political as well as market outcomes. This approach revolved several long-standing…
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