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ON THE EXISTENCE OF AN OPTIMAL CAPITAL STRUCTURE: THEORY AND EVIDENCE
ONE OF THE MOST contentious issues in the theory of finance during the past quarter century has been the theory of capital structure. The geneses of this controversy were the seminal contributions byExpand
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Leadership Structure: Separating the CEO and Chairman of the Board
Shareholder activists and regulators are pressuring U.S. firms to separate the titles of CEO and Chairman of the Board. They argue that separating the titles will reduce agency costs in corporationsExpand
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The Relative Signalling Power of Dutch-Auction and Fixed-Price Self-Tender Offers and Open-Market Share Repurchases
The authors compare three forms of common stock repurchases. Dutch-auction self-tender offers and open-market share repurchase programs are weaker signals of stock undervaluation than fixed-priceExpand
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Corporate focus and stock returns
Abstract Greater corporate focus is consistent with shareholder wealth maximization. Diseconomies of scope in the 1980s are confirmed by a trend towards focus or specialization, a positive relationExpand
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The Impact of Product Recalls on the Wealth of Sellers
What happens to the wealth of shareholders of firms producing defective products? Our answer-for producers of drugs and autos that were recalled from the market-is that the shareholders bear largeExpand
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Stock Trading before the Announcement of Tender Offers: Insider Trading or Market Anticipation?
Recent insider trading actions by the government against Dennis Levine, Ivan Boesky, Martin Siegel, and others have influenced the public's perception of mergers and acquisitions activity.' TheseExpand
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The Returns to Acquiring Firms in Tender Offers: Evidence from Three Decades
M Extensive empirical evidence supports the view that takeovers are beneficial to the shareholders of target firms.I Virtually every study has found that these shareholders receive large premiums,Expand
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Shark repellents and stock prices: The effects of antitakeover amendments since 1980
Abstract Antitakeover amendments (shark repellents) restrict the transfer of corporate control. On average, the public announcement of antitakeover amendments by 600 firms in the period 1979–1985 hasExpand
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The Market for Corporate Control: The Empirical Evidence Since 1980
C orporate takeovers have been very big business in the 1980s. The Office of the Chief Economist (OCE) of the Securities and Exchange Commission estimates that shareholders of target firms inExpand
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Dual-class recapitalizations as antitakeover mechanisms: The recent evidence
Abstract We report evidence on shareholder wealth effects of 94 firms recapitalizing with dual classes of common stock with disparate voting rights. We find significant, negative abnormal stock priceExpand
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