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Managerial Dilemmas: The Political Economy of Hierarchy.
List of tables and figures Series editors' preface Acknowledgements Part I. Why Have Hierarchy?: 1. Market failures and hierarchical solutions: the tension between individual and social rationalityExpand
▪ Abstract With tools borrowed from the economic analysis of insurance, principal-agency theory has allowed political scientists new insights into the role of information asymmetry and incentives inExpand
Cities by Contract: The Politics of Municipal Incorporation
The battle line in the urban conflict lies between the central city and the affluent suburb. The city, needing to broaden its tax base in order to provide increasingly necessary social services, hasExpand
Above Politics: Credible Commitment and Efficiency in the Design of Public Agencies
The state has, since its origins, been characterized both by the production of public goods and a competition for the surplus benefits generated by the creation of those goods. Holmstrom 's (1982)Expand
Bureaucrats, Legislators, and the Size of Government
Some recent theories have blamed the growth of government on budget-maximizing bureaucrats who are assumedly capable of imposing their most preferred budget-output combination on legislatures,Expand
Dealing with the Paradox of Embeddedness: The Role of Contracts and Trust in Facilitating Movement Out of Committed Relationships
When there are constantly new, valuable opportunities to transact with alternative partners---a situation we refer to as exchange value uncertainty---long-term or committed transactions among theExpand
The Impact of Economics on Contemporary Political Science
Early economic models assumed that the maximizing behavior of individual actors was the primary determinant of political as well as market outcomes. This approach revolved several long-standingExpand
Solutions to Principal-Agent Problems in Firms
There are many settings in which one economic actor (the principal) delegates authority to an agent to act on her behalf .T h ep r imary reason for doing so is that the agent has an advantage inExpand
Why Politics is More Fundamental Than Economics
Efficient incentive-compatible schemes for resolving hidden action and hidden information problems have been shown to exist, thereby offering the hope that public goods can be provided in a neutral,Expand
Activists and Partisan Realignment in the United States
In this paper, we contend that party realignments occur due to the interaction of candidates and activists. We examine independent party candidates who are motivated primarily to win elections butExpand