• Publications
  • Influence
Relative Performance Evaluation and Related Peer Groups in Executive Compensation Contracts
ABSTRACT: This study examines the explicit use of relative performance evaluation (RPE) in executive compensation contracts and the selection of RPE peers. Using S&P 1500 firms’ first proxyExpand
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Inside Debt and the Design of Corporate Debt Contracts
We find that higher CEO debt-like compensation leads to lower promised yield and fewer covenants in a sample of loans originated in 2006--2008. Expand
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Investor Sophistication and the Mispricing of Accruals
This paper examines the role of institutional investors in the pricing of accruals. Using Bushee;s (1998) classification of institutional investors, we show that firms with a high level ofExpand
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Earnings Management and Firm Performance Following Open-Market Repurchases
Both post-repurchase abnormal returns and "reported" improvement in operating performance are driven, at least in part, by pre-repurchase downward earnings management rather than genuine growth inExpand
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Earnings Management, Lawsuits, and Stock-for-Stock Acquirers' Market Performance
There is a positive association between stock-for-stock acquirers' pre-merger abnormal accruals and post-merger announcement lawsuits. The market only partially anticipates the effects of post-mergerExpand
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The Association Between Management Earnings Forecast Errors and Accruals
ABSTRACT: We investigate the association between errors in management forecasts of subsequent year earnings and current year accruals. In an uncertain operating environment, managers' assessments ofExpand
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Serial Correlation in Management Earnings Forecast Errors
We examine whether management earnings forecast errors exhibit serial correlation and how analysts understand the serial correlation property of management forecast errors. Management forecast errorsExpand
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Corporate Governance and Backdating of Executive Stock Options
This paper investigates whether weak corporate governance is a contributing factor to the incidence of backdating executive stock option awards. Based on a sample of S&P 1500 firms that exhibitExpand
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Earnings Non-Synchronicity and Voluntary Disclosure†
Earnings non-synchronicity reflects the extent to which firm-specific factors determine a firm's earnings. Prior research suggests that high earnings non-synchronicity impedes corporate outsiders'Expand
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The Effect of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act on the Timing Manipulation of CEO Stock Option Awards
Section 403 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act accelerates the reporting deadline of executive stock option grants to be within two business days after the grants. This study investigates the effect ofExpand
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