In this paper, we present the first approximation algorithms for the problem of designing revenue optimal Bayesian incentive compatible auctions when there are multiple (heterogeneous) items and when bidders have arbitrary demand and budget constraints.Expand

We introduce an algorithmic framework for studying combinatorial problems in the presence of multiple agents with submodular cost functions with tight upper and lower bounds for the approximability of these problems.Expand

We give a 3/4-approximation algorithm for MBA improving upon the previous best of sime0.632 and improve upon the best known approximation and hardness of approximation factors.Expand

In this paper we consider the following maximum budgeted allocation (MBA) problem: Given a set of $m$ indivisible items and $n$ agents, with each agent $i$ willing to pay $b_{ij}$ on item $j$ and with a maximum budget of $B_i$, the goal is to allocate items to agents to maximize revenue.Expand

In this paper we propose and analyze a new randomized greedy algorithm for finding a large matching in a general graph and use it to solve the query commit problem mentioned above.Expand

In this paper we consider a mechanism design problem in the context of large-scale crowdsourcing markets such as Amazon's Mechanical Turk mturk, ClickWorker clickworker, CrowdFlower crowdflower.Expand

We compare the expected efficiency of revenue maximizing (or optimal) mechanisms with that of efficiency maximizing ones, when bidder valuations are drawn i.d. from a Monotone Hazard Rate distribution.Expand