• Publications
  • Influence
Making Votes Count: Strategic Coordination in the World's Electoral Systems
  • G. Cox
  • Political Science
  • 28 March 1997
List of tables and figures Series editor's preface Preface PART I. INTRODUCTION: 1. Introduction 2. Duverger's propositions PART II. STRATEGIC VOTING: 3. On electoral systems 4. Strategic voting inExpand
Legislative Leviathan: Party Government in the House
This book provides an incisive new look at the inner workings of the House of Representatives in the post-World War II era. Reevaluating the role of parties and committees, Gary Cox and MathewExpand
Electoral Politics as a Redistributive Game
Spatial models of electoral competition typically simplify the analysis by ignoring the question of internal constituency politics: constituencies are modeled simply as a distribution of ideal pointsExpand
Setting the Agenda: Responsible Party Government in the U.S. House of Representatives
1. Introduction Part I. Why Party Government?: 2. Procedural Cartel theory Part II. Negative Agenda Power: 3. Cartel agenda model vs. floor agenda model 4. The primacy of Reed's rules in houseExpand
Centripetal and Centrifugal Incentives in Electoral Systems
  • G. Cox
  • Economics
  • 1 November 1990
This paper investigates how electoral laws affect the position-taking incentives of parties and candidates. It seeks to extend the finding presented in the classical "median voter theorem" to a wideExpand
Strategic Voting Equilibria under the Single Nontransferable Vote.
  • G. Cox
  • Economics
  • 1 September 1994
Previous investigations of strategic voting equilibria in mass electorates have looked only at single-member districts. I shall investigate such equilibria in multimember districts operating underExpand
Electoral Equilibrium under Alternative Voting Institutions
  • G. Cox
  • Political Science
  • 1 February 1987
This paper investigates the nature of multicandidate electoral equilibria under three different classes of single-ballot-single-winner voting systems: (1) scoring rules (including the plurality rule,Expand
Swing voters , core voters , and distributive politics
How do political parties allocate targetable goods – such as private goods targeted to individuals, local public goods targeted to geographic areas, or tax breaks targeted to specific industries orExpand
Why Did The Incumbency Advantage In U.S. House Elections Grow
Theory: A simple rational entry argument suggests that the value of incumbency consists not just of a direct effect, reflecting the value of resources (such as staff) attached to legislativeExpand
Electoral coordination occurs at two main levels: (a) within individual electoral districts, where competitors coordinate entry and citizens coordinate votes; and (b) across districts, as competitorsExpand