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The participant attack is the most serious threat for quantum secret-sharing protocols. We present a method to analyze the security of quantum secret-sharing protocols against this kind of attack taking the scheme of Hillery, Bužek, and Berthiaume (HBB) [Phys. Rev. A 59 1829 (1999)] as an example. By distinguishing between two mixed states, we derive the(More)
We show a quantum sharing of classical secret protocol using EPR pairs. Instead of distributing entangled particles to every player and letting them make a measurement in different bases randomly, we employ the entangled particles as a carrier to record the synthetical operations of all players. Even in the case of multi-party secret sharing, two-particle(More)
Fake one-time pad cannot be used to improve the efficiency of quantum communication Abstract Two misuses of one-time pad in improving the efficiency of quantum communication are pointed out. One happens when using some message bits to encrypt others, the other exists because the key bits are not truly random. Both of them result in the decrease of security.(More)
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