Franz Wirl

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If a regulator is unable to measure firms' individual emissions, an ambient tax can be used to achieve the socially desired level of pollution. With this tax, each firm pays a unit tax on aggregate emissions. In order for the tax to be effective, firms must recognize that their decisions affect aggregate emissions. When firms behave strategically with(More)
This paper investigates the dynamics of corruption at the top (i.e., by politicians). For this purpose a dynamic, politico-economic framework is developed and analyzed. A particular feature of this investigation is an analytical characterization of the dynamic properties of the system. This allows one to interpret these properties in terms of economic and(More)
Schelling (1978) suggested a simple binary choice model to explain the variation of corruption levels across societies. His basic idea was that expected profitability 1 of engaging in corruption depends on its prevalence. The key result of the so-called Schelling diagram is the existence of multiple equilibria and a tipping point. The present paper puts(More)
  • Sebastian Verfasser, Caban Angestrebter Akademischer Grad, Franz Wirl, Univ, Sebastian Caban Vienna
  • 2010
I hereby certify that the work reported in this thesis is my own, and the work done by other authors is appropriately cited. Abstract Many questions in managerial decision making imply —if uncertainty is involved— stochastic optimization problems of the form V (S) = max x E ∞ 0 e −ρt f (S, x) dt where the state transition dS = g(S, x) dt + σ(S) dz describes(More)