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We use cooperative game theory to analyze the impact of three controversial pipeline projects on the power structure in the Eurasian trade of natural gas. Two of them, Nord Stream and South Stream, allow Russian gas to bypass transit countries , Ukraine and Belarus. Nord Stream's strategic value turns out to be huge, justifying the high investment cost for(More)
In this paper we analyze how the bargaining power of the different players along the supply chain of Russian natural gas depends on the architecture of the transmission system and its possible extensions. By applying the Shapley value as a solution for multilateral bargaining we find that competition between Poland and Ukraine, and bypassing Ukraine is of(More)
Russian natural gas is delivered to Western Europe by pipelines, running through Ukraine, Poland and other transit countries. We derive the bargaining power of the different players along this supply chain endogenously from the architecture of the transmission system and its possible extensions by applying the Shapley–Value as a solution concept for(More)
information on the economics and politics of gas production and transportation. We are also grateful for comments by Astrid Matthey and seminar participants at the WZB in Berlin and HSE and Cefir in Moscow and for assistance Abstract We analyze how investment into the pipeline system supplying Russian natural gas to Western Europe is distorted for strategic(More)
November1996 Abstract The paper analysis rental contracts in a twoperiod model of the housing market with uncertainòutside option', accounting for non contractible mobilitycost and consumption indivisibilities. The main ndings are: (i) Bilaterally ecient contracts set rents which are less volatile than market rents for vacancies. (ii) Equilibriumcontracts(More)
Russia is the main supplier of natural gas for the Western European Market. The gas is delivered through a system of pipelines, running through Ukraine, Poland and other transit countries. Existing models of the interaction along this vertical chain assume incomplete contracts (setting only prices) and give Russia a strategic first mover advantage — the(More)
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