François Maniquet

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We study information aggregation in large elections. With two candidates, efficient information aggregation is possible in a large election (e.g., Feddersen and Pesendorfer [4, 5, 6], among others). We find that this result does not extend to large elections with more than two candidates. More precisely, we study a class of simple scoring rules in large(More)
We generalize the canonical problem of Nash implementation by allowing agents to voluntarily provide discriminatory signals, i.e. evidence. Evidence can either take the form of hard information or, more generally, have differential but non-prohibitive costs in different states. In such environments, social choice functions that are not Maskin-monotonic can(More)
We develop an approach which escapes Arrow’s impossibility by relying on information about agents’ indi¤erence curves instead of utilities. In a model where agents have unequal production skills and di¤erent preferences, we characterize social ordering functions which rely only on ordinal non-comparable information about individual preferences. These social(More)
This paper studies full-implementation in Nash equilibrium. We generalize the canonical model (Maskin, 1977) by allowing agents to send evidence or discriminatory signals. We first study settings where evidence is hard information that proves something about the state of the world. In such environments, social choice rules that are not Maskin-monotonic can(More)
In the assignment problem of indivisible objects with money, we study social ordering functions which satisfy the requirement that social orderings should be independent of changes in preferences over infeasible bundles. We combine this axiom with efficiency, consistency and equity axioms. Our result is that the only social ordering function satisfying(More)
The adoption of mandatory gender quotas in party lists has been a subject of discussion in many countries. Since any reform obviously requires the approval of a (sometimes qualified) majority of incumbent legislators’ votes, keeping an eye on incumbents’ interests and incentives in different systems seems a natural thing to do if we want to understand(More)