François Maniquet

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We study information aggregation in large elections. With two candidates , efficient information aggregation is possible in a large election (e.g., Feddersen and Pesendorfer [4, 5, 6], among others). We find that this result does not extend to large elections with more than two candidates. More precisely, we study a class of simple scoring rules in large(More)
We develop an approach which escapes Arrow's impossibility by relying on information about agents' indi¤erence curves instead of utilities. In a model where agents have unequal production skills and di¤erent preferences, we characterize social ordering functions which rely only on ordinal non-comparable information about individual preferences. These social(More)
We study equity in economies where a set of agents commonly own a technology producing a non-rival good from their private contributions. A social ordering function associates to each economy a complete ranking of the allocations. We build social ordering functions satisfying the property that individual welfare levels exceeding a legitimate upper bound(More)
A welfarist way of allocating resources consists in 1) equipping individuals with comparable indices of their well-being and 2) applying a unique aggregation rule to individual well-being levels. An equality of opportunity way of allocating resources consists in 1) making the distinction between personal characteristics which are under and beyond(More)
We study direct democracy with population uncertainty. Voters' participation is often among the desiderata by the election designer. A participation quorum is a threshold on the fraction of participating voters below which the status quo is kept. We show that participation quorums produce incentive for partisans of the status quo to abstain, with the(More)