François Maniquet

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We study information aggregation in large elections. With two candidates , efficient information aggregation is possible in a large election (e.g., Feddersen and Pesendorfer [4, 5, 6], among others). We find that this result does not extend to large elections with more than two candidates. More precisely, we study a class of simple scoring rules in large(More)
We generalize the canonical problem of Nash implementation by allowing agents to voluntarily provide discriminatory signals, i.e. evidence. Evidence can either take the form of hard information or, more generally, have differential but non-prohibitive costs in different states. In such environments, social choice functions that are not Maskin-monotonic can(More)
This paper studies full-implementation in Nash equilibrium. We generalize the canon-ical model (Maskin, 1977) by allowing agents to send evidence or discriminatory signals. We first study settings where evidence is hard information that proves something about the state of the world. In such environments, social choice rules that are not Maskin-monotonic can(More)
We develop an approach which escapes Arrow's impossibility by relying on information about agents' indi¤erence curves instead of utilities. In a model where agents have unequal production skills and di¤erent preferences, we characterize social ordering functions which rely only on ordinal non-comparable information about individual preferences. These social(More)
* We are highly indebted to Joan Scott for inspiring us and for many discussions on the parity movement in France. We are grateful to the Institute for Advanced Study in Princeton for giving us the opportunity to start this project. and by the participants at various workshops are gratefully acknowledged. We thank Ji Li, Chloé Tergiman and Violette Van Dyck(More)
We study equity in economies where a set of agents commonly own a technology producing a non-rival good from their private contributions. A social ordering function associates to each economy a complete ranking of the allocations. We build social ordering functions satisfying the property that individual welfare levels exceeding a legitimate upper bound(More)
We consider a committee, board, group or jury that faces a binary collective decision under uncertainty. Each member holds some private information and all members agree about what decision should be taken in each state of nature. However, the state is unknown and members may differ in their valuations of the two types of mistake that may occur, and/or in(More)