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We study fairness in economies with one private good and one partially excludable nonrival good. A social ordering function determines for each profile of preferences an ordering of all conceivable allocations. We propose the following Free Lunch Aversion condition: if the private good contributions of two agents consuming the same quantity of the nonrival(More)
We thank Giunia Gatta for her help with the presentation of the paper. Abstract In a model where agents have unequal skills and heterogeneous preferences, we look for the optimal tax on the basis of fairness principles and incentive-compatibility constraints. Our fairness principles lead us to construct new indices of individual well-being, and to apply the(More)
We study information aggregation in large elections. With two candidates , efficient information aggregation is possible in a large election (e.g., Feddersen and Pesendorfer [4, 5, 6], among others). We find that this result does not extend to large elections with more than two candidates. More precisely, we study a class of simple scoring rules in large(More)
We generalize the canonical problem of Nash implementation by allowing agents to voluntarily provide discriminatory signals, i.e. evidence. Evidence can either take the form of hard information or, more generally, have differential but non-prohibitive costs in different states. In such environments, social choice functions that are not Maskin-monotonic can(More)
This paper studies full-implementation in Nash equilibrium. We generalize the canon-ical model (Maskin, 1977) by allowing agents to send evidence or discriminatory signals. We first study settings where evidence is hard information that proves something about the state of the world. In such environments, social choice rules that are not Maskin-monotonic can(More)
We develop an approach which escapes Arrow's impossibility by relying on information about agents' indi¤erence curves instead of utilities. In a model where agents have unequal production skills and di¤erent preferences, we characterize social ordering functions which rely only on ordinal non-comparable information about individual preferences. These social(More)