Learn More
Empirical studies in economics and behav-ioral ecology suggest that, ceteris paribus, animals and humans appear to place less weight on the future than on the present, i.e., they act as though they discount future payoffs. Furthermore (and more interestingly), they do so with discount rates that increase as the time before those payoffs are realized grows(More)
We study fairness in economies with one private good and one partially excludable nonrival good. A social ordering function determines for each profile of preferences an ordering of all conceivable allocations. We propose the following Free Lunch Aversion condition: if the private good contributions of two agents consuming the same quantity of the nonrival(More)
We generalize the canonical problem of Nash implementation by allowing agents to voluntarily provide discriminatory signals, i.e. evidence. Evidence can either take the form of hard information or, more generally, have differential but non-prohibitive costs in different states. In such environments, social choice functions that are not Maskin-monotonic can(More)
It is the most cruel mockery to tell a man he may vote for A or B, when you know that he is so much under the influence of A, or the friends of A, that his voting for B would be attended with the destruction of him. It is not he who has the vote, really and substantially , but his landlord, for it is for his benefit and interest that it is exercised in the(More)
We study information aggregation in large elections. With two candidates , efficient information aggregation is possible in a large election (e.g., Feddersen and Pesendorfer [4, 5, 6], among others). We find that this result does not extend to large elections with more than two candidates. More precisely, we study a class of simple scoring rules in large(More)
We study equity in economies where a set of agents commonly own a technology producing a non-rival good from their private contributions. A social ordering function associates to each economy a complete ranking of the allocations. We build social ordering functions satisfying the property that individual welfare levels exceeding a legitimate upper bound(More)
We develop an approach which escapes Arrow's impossibility by relying on information about agents' indi¤erence curves instead of utilities. In a model where agents have unequal production skills and di¤erent preferences, we characterize social ordering functions which rely only on ordinal non-comparable information about individual preferences. These social(More)