This paper studies the effects of analogy-based reasoning in static two-player games of incomplete information. As in Jehiel (" Analogy-Based Expectation Equilibrium " , Journal of Economic Theory, forthcoming) players are assumed to be boundedly rational in the way they forecast their opponent's state-contingent strategy. They bundle states into analogy… (More)
This paper characterizes geometrically the set of all Nash equilibrium payoffs achievable with unmediated communication in persuasion games, i.e., games with an informed expert and an uninformed decisionmaker in which the expert's information is certifiable. The first equilibrium characterization is provided for unilateral persuasion games, and the second… (More)
1 I am deeply indebted to Gaël Giraud for helpful comments and suggestions. I am grateful to Hubert Stahn, Gisèle Umbhauer, and particularly Guillaume Haeringer for help in improving the exposition of the paper. I also thank Patrick Roger and Anthony Ziegelmeyer for helpful conversations during a seminar presentation. Of course, any remaining errors are my… (More)
This note compares public and private information certification in a simple class of communication games with one sender and two receivers. It also emphasizes the role of belief consistency conditions in a perfect Bayesian equilibrium of such games.
We survey the main results on strategic information transmission, which is often referred to as " persuasion " when types are verifiable and as " cheap talk " when they are not. In the simplest model, an informed player sends a single message to a receiver who makes a decision. The players'utilities depend on the sender's information and the receiver's… (More)
In persuasion games, it is well known that a perfectly revealing equilibrium may fail to exist when the decision maker is uncertain about the interested party's payoff-relevant information. However, by explicitly integrating higher order uncertainty into the information structure, this paper shows that a perfectly revealing equilibrium does exist when… (More)
This paper investigates optimal communication mechanisms in a framework with a two-dimensional decision space and no monetary transfers. If the conflicts of interests between the principal and the agent are different on each dimension, the principal can better extract information from the agent by using the spread between the two decisions as a costly and… (More)
This paper studies the value of private information in strictly competitive interactions in which there is a trade-off between (i) the short-run gain of using information, and (ii) the long-run gain of concealing it. We implement simple examples from the class of zero-sum repeated games with incomplete information. While the empirical value of information… (More)