Frédéric Koessler

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This paper studies the effects of analogy-based expectations in static two-player games of incomplete information. Players are assumed to be boundedly rational in the way they forecast their opponent's state-contingent strategy: they bundle states into analogy classes and play best-responses to their opponent's average strategy in those analogy classes. We(More)
1 I am deeply indebted to Gaël Giraud for helpful comments and suggestions. I am grateful to Hubert Stahn, Gisèle Umbhauer, and particularly Guillaume Haeringer for help in improving the exposition of the paper. I also thank Patrick Roger and Anthony Ziegelmeyer for helpful conversations during a seminar presentation. Of course, any remaining errors are my(More)
This paper investigates optimal communication mechanisms in a framework with a two-dimensional decision space and no monetary transfers. If the conflicts of interests between the principal and the agent are different on each dimension, the principal can better extract information from the agent by using the spread between the two decisions as a costly and(More)
We survey the main results on strategic information transmission, which is often referred to as " persuasion " when types are verifiable and as " cheap talk " when they are not. In the simplest model, an informed player sends a single message to a receiver who makes a decision. The players'utilities depend on the sender's information and the receiver's(More)
Social interactions arguably provide a rationale for several important socioeconomic phenomena , from smoking and other risky behavior in teens to peer effects in school performance. We study social interactions in dynamic economies. For these economies, we provide existence (Markov Perfect Equilibrium in pure strategies), ergodicity, and welfare results.(More)
This paper studies the value of private information in strictly competitive interactions in which there is a trade-off between (i) the short-run gain of using information, and (ii) the long-run gain of concealing it. We implement simple examples from the class of zero-sum repeated games with incomplete information. While the empirical value of information(More)