Frédéric Koessler

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This paper studies the effects of analogy-based reasoning in static two-player games of incomplete information. As in Jehiel (" Analogy-Based Expectation Equilibrium " , Journal of Economic Theory, forthcoming) players are assumed to be boundedly rational in the way they forecast their opponent's state-contingent strategy. They bundle states into analogy(More)
The role of extracellular K+ concentration in the propagation velocity of action potential was tested in isolated rat skeletal muscles. Different K+ concentrations were produced by KCl additions to extracellular solution. Action potentials were measured extracellularly by means of two annular platinum electrodes. Fibre bundles of m. soleus (SOL), m.(More)
This paper examines the occurrence and fragility of information cascades in two laboratory experiments. One group of low informed participants guess sequentially which of two states has been randomly chosen. In a matched pairs design, another group of high informed participants make similar guesses after having observed the guesses of the low informed(More)
This article asks when communication with certifiable information leads to complete information sharing. We consider Bayesian games augmented by a pre-play communication phase in which announcements are made publicly. We characterize the augmented games in which there exists a full disclosure sequential equilibrium with extremal beliefs (i.e., any deviation(More)
Maximum twitch and tetanic tension development, time to peak, and half relaxation time were studied on isolated frog sartorius muscles stimulated directly in Ringer's solution at different temperatures. Cooling from 20 degrees C to 10 degrees C decreased the tetanic tension (Q10 = 1.3-1.4). At temperatures above 25 (30) degrees C the tension output was(More)
This paper examines a game-theoretical model of parimutuel betting markets with asymmetric information. Generically, all Bayesian-Nash equilibria of the simultaneous game are characterized depending on the number of bettors and the quality of their private information. An equilibrium where all bettors use their private information always exists and becomes(More)
This paper reports two laboratory studies designed to study the impact of public information about past departure rates on congestion levels and travel costs. Our experimental design is based on a discrete version of Arnott , de Palma , and Lindsey ' s (1990) bottleneck model where subjects have to choose their departure time in order to reach a common(More)
This paper characterizes geometrically the set of all Nash equilibrium payoffs achievable with unmediated communication in persuasion games, i.e., games with an informed expert and an uninformed decisionmaker in which the expert's information is certifiable. The first equilibrium characterization is provided for unilateral persuasion games, and the second(More)
1 I am deeply indebted to Gaël Giraud for helpful comments and suggestions. I am grateful to Hubert Stahn, Gisèle Umbhauer, and particularly Guillaume Haeringer for help in improving the exposition of the paper. I also thank Patrick Roger and Anthony Ziegelmeyer for helpful conversations during a seminar presentation. Of course, any remaining errors are my(More)