Florian Scheuer

Learn More
This paper analyzes Pareto optimal non-linear taxation of profits and labor income in a private information economy with endogenous firm formation. Individuals differ in both their skill and their cost of setting up a firm, and choose between becoming workers and entrepreneurs. I show that a tax system in which entrepreneurial profits and labor income must(More)
VANETs have the potential to dramatically increase road safety by giving drivers more time to react adequately to dangerous situations. To prevent abuse of VANETs, a security infrastructure is needed that ensures security requirements like message integrity, confidentiality, and availability. After giving more details on our security infrastructure we(More)
We develop a unifying framework for optimal income taxation in multi-activity economies with general production technologies. Agents are characterized by an N-dimensional skill vector that captures intrinsic abilities in N activities. The private return to each activity depends on individual skill and an aggregate activity-specific return, which is a(More)
In vehicular ad hoc networks (VANETs) tracking of participants is an issue that is examined by many research groups. These groups came up with several different concepts of counter measures against tracking attacks. All of these presented techniques seem to offer a pretty good protection. We pick out two very promising concepts - the Mix Zones and the(More)
Model checking is a promising approach for the verification of embedded systems software. The [mc]square approach for verification of binary code provides several improvements compared to other existing methods: the system model is automatically derived from the binary code using dedicated microcontroller simulators and state spaces are reduced by applying(More)
In the presence of a time-inconsistency problem with agency contracts, we show that competitive markets can implement allocations that Pareto-dominate those achieved by a benevolent government, and they induce more effort. We analyze a model with moral hazard and a two-sided lack of commitment. After agents have chosen their work, firms can modify contracts(More)
We examine equilibria in competitive insurance markets with adverse selection when wealth differences arise endogenously from unobservable savings or labor supply decisions. The endogeneity of wealth implies that high risk individuals may ceteris paribus exhibit the lower marginal willingness to pay for insurance than low risks, a phenomenon that we refer(More)
A principal wishes to screen an agent along several dimensions of private information simultaneously. The agent has quasilinear preferences that are additively separable across the various components. We consider a robust version of the principal’s problem, in which she knows the marginal distribution of each component of the agent’s type, but does not know(More)