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- Florian Brandl, Felix Brandt, Johannes Hofbauer
- AAMAS
- 2015

Preliminaries • A social decision scheme (SDS) is a function that maps a preference profile to a lottery over the alternatives. Formally, an SDS is a function f : í µí³¡ í µí³(í µí³) → ∆(A). • An SDS is majoritarian if it only depends on the (unweighted) majority comparisons between alternatives. • We compare lotteries using stochastic dominance (SD). A… (More)

- Haris Aziz, Florian Brandl
- AAMAS
- 2012

Hedonic Games • A player's appreciation of a coalition structure (partition) only depends on the coalition he is a member of • Many applications in social, economic and political settings: social networks , company merging, matching markets, etc. • Questions: How to model stability in hedonic games? What conditions guarantee the existence of stable… (More)

- Florian Brandl, Felix Brandt, Johannes Hofbauer
- ArXiv
- 2015

We consider randomized mechanisms with optional participation. Preferences over lotteries are modeled using skew-symmetric bilinear (SSB) utility functions, a generalization of classic von Neumann-Morgenstern utility functions. We show that every welfare-maximizing mechanism entices participation and that the converse holds under additional assumptions. Two… (More)

- Haris Aziz, Florian Brandl, Felix Brandt
- AAAI
- 2014

Efficiency—no agent can be made better off without making another one worse off—and strategyproofness—no agent can obtain a more preferred outcome by misrepresenting his preferences—are two cornerstones of economics and ubiquitous in important areas such as voting, auctions, or matching markets. Within the context of random assignment, Bogo-molnaia and… (More)

- Haris Aziz, Florian Brandl, Felix Brandt
- EC
- 2014

Perhaps one of the most fundamental notions in economics is that of Pareto efficiency. We study Pareto efficiency in a setting that involves two kinds of uncertainty: Uncertainty over the possible outcomes is modeled using probability distributions (lotteries) whereas uncertainty over the agents' preferences over lotteries is modeled using sets of plausible… (More)

- Florian Brandl, Felix Brandt, Hans Georg Seedig
- ArXiv
- 2015

Two fundamental axioms in social choice theory are consistency with respect to a variable electorate and consistency with respect to components of similar alternatives. In the context of traditional non-probabilistic social choice, these axioms are incompatible with each other. We show that in the context of prob-abilistic social choice, these axioms… (More)

- Florian Brandl, Felix Brandt, Christian Geist, Johannes Hofbauer
- IJCAI
- 2015

Preliminaries • A social choice function (SCF) maps every preference profile to a subset of the alternatives.

- Florian Brandl
- ArXiv
- 2016

Given a skew-symmetric matrix, the corresponding two-player symmetric zero-sum game is defined as follows: one player, the row player, chooses a row and the other player, the column player, chooses a column. The payoff of the row player is given by the corresponding matrix entry, the column player receives the negative of the row player. A randomized… (More)

- Florian Brandl, Felix Brandt, Martin Strobel
- AAMAS
- 2015

Coalition formation provides a versatile framework for analyzing cooperative behavior in multi-agent systems. In particular , hedonic coalition formation has gained considerable attention in the literature. An interesting class of hedonic games recently introduced by Aziz et al. [3] are fractional hedonic games. In these games, the utility an agent assigns… (More)

- Florian Brandl, Felix Brandt, Christian Geist
- IJCAI
- 2016

Two important requirements when aggregating the preferences of multiple agents are that the outcome should be economically efficient and the aggrega-tion mechanism should not be manipulable. In this paper, we provide a computer-aided proof of a sweeping impossibility using these two conditions for randomized aggregation mechanisms. More precisely, we show… (More)