Flavio M. Menezes

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We analyze simultaneous discrete public good games with incomplete information and continuous contributions. To use the terminology of Ad-mati and Perry (1991), we consider contribution and subscription games. In the former, contributions are not refunded if the project is not completed , while in the latter they are. We provide necessary conditions that(More)
Flavio Menezes acknowledges the financial assistance from the Australian National University and from IMPA/CNPq (Brazil). We thank G. Mailath and seminar participants at ANU for helpful comments. The usual disclaimer applies. Abstract Suppose a seller wants to sell k similar or identical objects and there are n > k potential buyers. Suppose that buyers want(More)
We m o d e l a t w o periods monopoly market with two-sided quality uncertainty. In the rst period, the seller gathers information about con-sumers' tastes upon observing its sales. In the second period, the seller may o r m a y not deliver the information. If the monopolist must commit either to reveal or conceal past-sales before observing them,(More)