Filip Matějka

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Individuals must often choose among discrete actions with imperfect information about their payoffs. Before choosing, they have an opportunity to study the payoffs, but doing so is costly. This creates new choices such as the number of and types of questions to ask. We model these situations using the rational inattention approach to information frictions.(More)
Apparently mistaken decisions are ubiquitous. To what extent does this reflect irrationality, as opposed to a rational trade-off between the costs of information acquisition and the expected benefits of learning? We develop a revealed preference test that characterizes all patterns of choice “mistakes” consistent with a general model of optimal costly(More)
We link two important ideas: attention is scarce and lack of information about an individual drives discrimination in selection decisions. Our model of allocation of costly attention implies that applicants from negatively stereotyped groups face “attention discrimination”: less attention in highly selective cherry-picking markets, where more attention(More)
A series of experiments are described on the acceptance, by red foxes (Vulpes vulpes) and other species, of two types of vaccine-baits intended to deliver liquid rabies vaccine. The baits consisted of a cube of sponge coated in a mixture of tallow and wax, or a plastic blister-pack embedded in tallow. All baits contained tetracycline as a biological marking(More)
This paper presents a model of a rationally inattentive seller responding to shocks to unit input cost. The model generates price series simultaneously exhibiting all three of the following features that can be found in data. 1) Prices change frequently. 2)Responses of prices to aggregate variables are delayed. 3)Prices move back and forth between a few(More)
Economists are increasingly interested in how attention impacts behavior, and therefore in models of rational inattention. We characterize choice behaviors associated with a general model of rational inattention. Our model encompasses all those currently in the literature. The necessary and su¢ cient conditions on the data are simple and intuitive. We(More)
We solve a general class of dynamic rational-inattention problems in which an agent repeatedly acquires costly information about an evolving state and selects actions. The solution resembles the choice rule in a dynamic logit model, but it is biased towards an optimal default rule that is independent of the realized state. The model provides the same fit to(More)