Fernando Vega-Redondo

Learn More
A 2_2 game is played repeatedly by two satisficing players. The game considered includes the Prisoner's Dilemma, as well as games of coordination and common interest. Each player has an aspiration at each date, and takes an action. The action is switched at the subsequent period only if the achieved payoff falls below aspirations; the switching probability(More)
We consider a setting where every pair of players that undertake a transaction (e.g. exchange goods or information) create a unit surplus. A transaction can take place only if the players involved have a connection. If the connection is direct the two players split the surplus equally while if it is indirect then intermediate players also get an equal share(More)
The problem of searchability in decentralized complex networks is of great importance in computer science, economy, and sociology. We present a formalism that is able to cope simultaneously with the problem of search and the congestion effects that arise when parallel searches are performed, and we obtain expressions for the average search cost both in the(More)
This paper develops a simple model to examine the interaction between partner choice and individual behavior in games of coordination. An important ingredient of our approach is the way we model partner choice: we suppose that a player can establish ties with other players by unilaterally investing in costly pairwise links. In this context, individual(More)
In a well networked community, there is intense social interaction, and information disseminates briskly and broadly. This is important if the environment is volatile (i.e., keeps changing) and individuals never stop searching for fresh opportunities. Here, we present a simple model that attributes the rise of a dynamic society to the emergence of some key(More)
We study an evolutionary model where agents are locally matched to play a symmetric coordination game. Opportunities to adjust strategy and location arrive asynchronously and infrequently, and cannot be coordinated. Our results on the short-run co-existence of different conventions and long-run efficiency depend upon a condition on off-equilibrium payoffs(More)
The current economic crisis illustrates a critical need for new and fundamental understanding of the structure and dynamics of economic networks. Economic systems are increasingly built on interdependencies, implemented through trans-national credit and investment networks, trade relations, or supply chains that have proven difficult to predict and control.(More)
In contexts ranging from public goods provision to information collection, a player’s well-being depends on own action as well as on the actions taken by his or her neighbors. We provide a framework to analyze such strategic interactions when neighborhood structure, modeled in terms of an underlying network of connections, affects payoffs. In our framework,(More)
We study a setting in which individual players choose their partners as well as a mode of behavior in 2 x 2 anti-coordination games -games where a player's best response is to behave differently than the opponent. We characterize the nature of equilibrium networks as well as study the effects of network structure on individual behavior. Our analysis shows(More)