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—We present an effective implementation of the PRIME+PROBE side-channel attack against the last-level cache. We measure the capacity of the covert channel the attack creates and demonstrate a cross-core, cross-VM attack on multiple versions of GnuPG. Our technique achieves a high attack resolution without relying on weaknesses in the OS or virtual machine(More)
Side-channels enable attackers to break a cipher by exploiting observable information from the cipher program's execution to infer its secret key. While some defenses have been proposed to protect information leakage due to certain side channels, the effectiveness of these defenses have mostly been given only qualitative analysis by their authors. It is(More)
Correctly functioning caches have been shown to leak critical secrets like encryption keys, through various types of cache side-channel attacks. This nullifies the security provided by strong encryption and allows confidentiality breaches, impersonation attacks and fake services. Hence, future cache designs must consider security, ideally without degrading(More)
Modern Intel processors use an undisclosed hash function to map memory lines into last-level cache slices. In this work we develop a technique for reverse-engineering the hash function. We apply the technique to a 6-core Intel processor and demonstrate that knowledge of this hash function can facilitate cache-based side channel attacks, reducing the amount(More)
Cache side channel attacks are serious threats to multi-tenant public cloud platforms. Past work showed how secret information in one virtual machine (VM) can be extracted by another co-resident VM using such attacks. Recent research demonstrated the feasibility of high-bandwidth, low-noise side channel attacks on the last-level cache (LLC), which is shared(More)
Information leakage through cache side channels is a serious threat in computer systems. The leak of secret cryptographic keys voids the protections provided by strong cryptography and software virtualization. Past cache side channel defenses focused almost entirely on data caches. Recently, instruction cache based side-channel attacks have been(More)
—Side channel attacks exploit inadvertent information leakage from the physical implementation of computing systems, bypassing the theoretical strength of cryptographic algorithms. Of particular concern are software side-channel attacks which can be mounted remotely without access or alteration of the hardware system. One type of attack that has been(More)
—Adding new hardware features to a cloud computing server requires testing both the functionalities and the performance of the new hardware mechanisms. However, commonly used cloud computing server workloads are not well-represented by the SPEC integer and floating-point benchmark and Parsec suites typically used by the computer architecture community.(More)