Falk Schellenberg

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We examine the widespread SimonsVoss digital locking system 3060 G2 that relies on an undisclosed, proprietary protocol to mutually authenticate transponders and locks. For assessing the security of the system, several tasks have to be performed: By decapsulating the used microcontrollers with acid and circumventing their read-out protection with UV-C(More)
In the past years, various electronic access control systems have been found to be insecure. In consequence, attacks have emerged that permit unauthorized access to secured objects. One of the few remaining, allegedly secure digital locking systems—the system 3060 manufactured and marketed by SimonsVoss—is employed in numerous objects worldwide. Following(More)
Side-channel analysis has become a well-established topic in the scientific community and industry over the last one and a half decade. Somewhat surprisingly, the vast majority of work on side-channel analysis has been restricted to the “use case” of attacking cryptographic implementations through the recovery of keys. In this contribution, we(More)
Often overlooked, microcontrollers are the central component in embedded systems which drive the evolution toward the Internet of Things (IoT). They are small, easy to handle, low cost, and with myriads of pervasive applications. An increasing number of microcontroller-equipped systems are security and safety critical. In this tutorial, we take a critical(More)
Laser Fault Injection (LFI) is one of the most powerful methods of inducing a fault as it allows targeting only specific areas down to single transistors. The downside compared to non-invasive methods like introducing clock glitches is the largely increased search space. An exhaustive search through all parameters including dimensions for correct timing,(More)
Laser Fault Injection (LFI) is a powerful method of introducing faults into a specific area of an integrated circuit. Because the minimum spot size of the laser spot is physically bounded, many recent publications investigate down to which technology node individual transistors can be targeted. In contrast, we develop a novel attack that is applicable even(More)
We examine the widespread SimonsVoss digital locking system 3060 G2 that relies on an undisclosed, proprietary protocol to mutually authenticate transponders and locks. For assessing the security of the system, several tasks have to be performed: By decapsulating the used microcontrollers with acid and circumventing their read-out protection with UV-C(More)
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