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We construct an uncoupled randomized strategy of repeated play such that, if every player plays according to it, mixed action profiles converge almost surely to a Nash equilibrium of the stage game. The strategy requires very little in terms of information about the game, as players' actions are based only on their own past payoffs. Moreover, in a variant… (More)

Given a game and a dynamics on the space of strategies it is possible to associate to any component of Nash equilibria, an integer, this is the index, see Ritzberger (1994). This number gives useful information on the equilibrium set and in particular on its stability properties under the given dynamics. We prove that indices of components always coincide… (More)

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