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We construct an uncoupled randomized strategy of repeated play such that, if every player plays according to it, mixed action profiles converge almost surely to a Nash equilibrium of the stage game. The strategy requires very little in terms of information about the game, as players' actions are based only on their own past payoffs. Moreover, in a variant… (More)

Given a game and a dynamics on the space of strategies it is possible to associate to any component of Nash equilibria, an integer, this is the index, see Ritzberger (1994). This number gives useful information on the equilibrium set and in particular on its stability properties under the given dynamics. We prove that indices of components always coincide… (More)

- P.-A Chiappori, I Ekeland, F Kübler, H M Polemarchakis, Donald Brown, Gérard Debreu +7 others
- 2002

Is general equilibrium theory empirically testable? Our perspective on this question differs from the standard, Sonnenschein-Debreu-Mantel (SDM) viewpoint. While SDM tradition considers aggregate (excess) demand as a function of prices, we assume that what is observable is the equilibrium price vector as a function of the fundamentals * The National Science… (More)

We show that every N-player K 1 × · · · × K N game possesses a correlated equilibrium with at least N i=1 K i − 1 − N i=1 K i (K i − 1) zero entries. In particular, the largest N-player K ×· · ·×K games with unique fully supported correlated equilibrium are two-player games. 1 The result Consider an N-player K 1 × · · · × K N normal form game γ = (N, S, {γ… (More)

- Davide Cianciaruso, Fabrizio Germano
- 2011

By identifying types whose low-order beliefs – up to level i – about the state of nature coincide, we obtain quotient type spaces that are typically smaller than the original ones, preserve basic topological properties, and allow standard equilibrium analysis even under bounded reasoning. Our Bayesian Nash (i, −i)-equilibria capture players' inability to… (More)

- Simon P Anderson, Øystein Foros, Hans Jarle Kind, Fabrizio Germano, Lisa George, Jacques Cremer +4 others
- 2014

Standard models of advertising-…nanced media assume consumers patronize a single media platform, precluding e¤ective competition for advertisers. Such competition ensues if consumers multi-home. The principle of incremental pricing implies that multi-homing consumers are less valuable to platforms. Then entry of new platforms decreases ad prices, while a… (More)

In an example with two objects and four bidders, some of which have superadditive values, we characterize the equilibria of a simultaneous ascending auction and compare the revenue and efficiency generated with ones generated by the sequential, the one-shot simultaneous , and the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves auctions.

- James S Costain, Fabrizio Germano, Joel Shapiro, Stephen Morris, Hyun Song Shin, Frank Heinemann +4 others
- 2010

Recently, it has been claimed that full-information multiple equilibria in games with strategic complementarities are not robust, because generalizing to allow slightly heterogeneous information implies uniqueness. This paper argues that this " global games " uniqueness result is itself not robust. If we generalize by allowing most agents to observe a few… (More)

- Fabrizio Germano
- 1999

We extend Kohlberg and Mertens' (1986) structure theorem concerning the Nash equilibrium correspondence to show that its graph is not only homeomorphic to the underlying space of games but that it is also unknotted. This is then shown to have some basic consequences for dynamics whose rest points are Nash equilibria. * We would like to thank Eddie Dekel and… (More)

- Fabrizio Germano, Antonio Cabrales, Vince Crawford, Thibault Gajdos, Ehud Lehrer, G Abor Lu-Gosi +1 other
- 2004

This paper studies the evolution of boundedly rational rules for playing normal form games within environments of stochastically varying games. Essentially, i t i s s h o wn that many of the \folk results" of evolutionary game theory, t ypically obtained with a xed game, carry over to corresponding stochastic dynamics over rules for playing stochastically… (More)