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We construct an uncoupled randomized strategy of repeated play such that, if every player plays according to it, mixed action profiles converge almost surely to a Nash equilibrium of the stage game. The strategy requires very little in terms of information about the game, as players' actions are based only on their own past payoffs. Moreover, in a variant(More)
Is general equilibrium theory empirically testable? Our perspective on this question differs from the standard, Sonnenschein-Debreu-Mantel (SDM) viewpoint. While SDM tradition considers aggregate (excess) demand as a function of prices, we assume that what is observable is the equilibrium price vector as a function of the fundamentals * The National Science(More)
We show that every N-player K 1 × · · · × K N game possesses a correlated equilibrium with at least N i=1 K i − 1 − N i=1 K i (K i − 1) zero entries. In particular, the largest N-player K ×· · ·×K games with unique fully supported correlated equilibrium are two-player games. 1 The result Consider an N-player K 1 × · · · × K N normal form game γ = (N, S, {γ(More)
By identifying types whose low-order beliefs – up to level i – about the state of nature coincide, we obtain quotient type spaces that are typically smaller than the original ones, preserve basic topological properties, and allow standard equilibrium analysis even under bounded reasoning. Our Bayesian Nash (i, −i)-equilibria capture players' inability to(More)
Standard models of advertising-…nanced media assume consumers patronize a single media platform, precluding e¤ective competition for advertisers. Such competition ensues if consumers multi-home. The principle of incremental pricing implies that multi-homing consumers are less valuable to platforms. Then entry of new platforms decreases ad prices, while a(More)
Recently, it has been claimed that full-information multiple equilibria in games with strategic complementarities are not robust, because generalizing to allow slightly heterogeneous information implies uniqueness. This paper argues that this " global games " uniqueness result is itself not robust. If we generalize by allowing most agents to observe a few(More)
We extend Kohlberg and Mertens' (1986) structure theorem concerning the Nash equilibrium correspondence to show that its graph is not only homeomorphic to the underlying space of games but that it is also unknotted. This is then shown to have some basic consequences for dynamics whose rest points are Nash equilibria. * We would like to thank Eddie Dekel and(More)
This paper studies the evolution of boundedly rational rules for playing normal form games within environments of stochastically varying games. Essentially, i t i s s h o wn that many of the \folk results" of evolutionary game theory, t ypically obtained with a xed game, carry over to corresponding stochastic dynamics over rules for playing stochastically(More)