Fabrice Le Lec

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This paper reports results of a 'probabilistic dictator game' experiment in which subjects had to allocate chances to win a prize between themselves and a dummy player. We have manipulated (within subjects) two aspects of the game: the relative values of the prizes (being equal for the two players, higher for the dictator or higher for the dummy) and the(More)
When taking into account the chances of success, strategic mating motivations do imply a bias not toward the most attractive individuals, but toward average or mildly attractive individuals, undermining the explanation of Maestripieri et al. at a fundamental level. This leaves open the possibility of alternative explanations and calls for a full-fledged(More)
This paper investigates experimentally whether risk attitudes are stable across social contexts. In particular, it focuses on situations where some resource (for instance, a position, decision power, a bonus) has to be allocated between two parties: the decision maker can either opt for sharing the resource or for using a random device that allocates the(More)
Using a laboratory experiment, we examine whether informal monetary sanctions can lead to better coordination in a repeated minimum effort coordination game. While most groups first experience inefficient coordination, the efficiency increases substantially after introducing an ex post sanctioning possibility. Namely, subjects can assign punishment points(More)
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