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Political business cycles at the municipal level
The present article tests predictions of rational political business cycle models using a large and previously unexplored data set of Portuguese municipalities. This data allows for a clean test ofExpand
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Election results and opportunistic policies: A new test of the rational political business cycle model
The literature on the rational PBC suggests that politicians systematically manipulate economic and fiscal conditions before elections to increase their chances of reelection. Most tests of thisExpand
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How Does Political Instability Affect Economic Growth
The purpose of this paper is to empirically determine the effects of political instability on economic growth. Using the system-GMM estimator for linear dynamic panel data models on a sample coveringExpand
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How Does Political Instability Affect Economic Growth?
The purpose of this paper is to empirically determine the effects of political instability on economic growth. By using the system-GMM estimator for linear dynamic panel data models on a sampleExpand
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How Does Political Instability Affect Economic Growth?
The purpose of this paper is to empirically determine the effects of political instability on economic growth. Using the system-GMM estimator for linear dynamic panel data models on a sample coveringExpand
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Does Opportunism Pay Off
This article tests the hypothesis that the opportunistic manipulation of financial accounts by mayors increases their chances of re-election. Working with a large and detailed dataset comprising allExpand
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Political instability and inflation volatility
Abstract The purpose of this paper is to empirically analyze the effects of political instability, social polarization and the quality of institutions on inflation volatility over time and acrossExpand
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The Political Economy of Seigniorage
While most economists agree that seigniorage is one way governments finance deficits, there is less agreement about the political, institutional, and economic reasons for relying on it. This paperExpand
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Delays of Inflation Stabilizations
In some new political economic models, delays of stabilizations result from coordination problems caused by collective choice-making mechanisms. Although several previous studies have tested theExpand
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The Political Economy of Seigniorage
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